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Abstract
Emergency services support is one of the most valued features of the public switched
telephone network. With the transition to IP-based communication the opportunity to
re-design the emergency services communication architecture emerged. It was a chance to
offer more features with improved security and privacy properties.
This dissertation makes a contribution to the design of an IP-based emergency services
architecture that offers international applicability, and multi-media support. Due to the
extended functionality emergency calls can also be triggered by vehicles and Internet of
Things devices. Security and privacy was taken care off during the work on this architecture.

Zusammenfassung
Die Unterstu¨tzung von Notrufdiensten ist eine der am meisten gescha¨tzten Funktio-
nen des o¨ffentlichen Telefonnetzes. Mit dem U¨bergang zur IP-basierten Kommunikation
werden neue Gescha¨ftsmodelle und Funktionen untersucht. Diese Entwicklung bietet die
Mo¨glichkeit einer Neugestaltung, die unter anderem auch sicherer ist und bessere Eigen-
schaften fu¨r den Datenschutz bietet.
Diese Dissertation leistet einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung einer auf dem Internet Pro-
tokoll basierenden Notrufarchitektur, welche international anwendbar ist und eine Multime-
diafa¨higkeit besitzt. Durch die erweiterte Funktionalita¨t ko¨nnen Notrufe auch von Fahrzeu-
gen und von Internet der Dinge ausgelo¨st werden. Auf Sicherheit und Datenschutz wurde
schon bei der Entwicklung der Architektur Ru¨cksicht genommen.
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Chapter1
Introduction
1.1. Background
The ability to call up the police, the fire department or an ambulance in emergencies is one of
the most important functions available when using the telephone. As telephone functionality
moves from circuit-switched to Internet telephony, its users rightfully expect that this core
feature will continue to be available and work as well as it has in the past. Users also expect
to be able to reach emergency assistance using new communication devices, such as instant
messaging or real-time text, and utilize new media, such as video or data. In all cases, the
basic objective is the same: The person seeking help needs to be connected with the most
appropriate public safety answering point (PSAP), where call takers dispatch assistance to
the caller’s location. Users typically assume accurate location to be available to call takers
and first responders. PSAPs are responsible for a particular geographic region, which can
be as small as a single university campus or as large as a country.
The Internet infrastructure is used for a wide range of services, including for real-time
communication between friends, within enterprises, and with business partners as part of
e-commerce transactions. IP-based emergency services are an extension of this communi-
cation infrastructure. Around 2004/2005, work on IP-based emergency services was kicked
off officially by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) with the formation of the ‘Emer-
gency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies’ (ECRIT) working group. At that time
the standardization work on the VoIP-based communication protocol SIP (the Session Initi-
ation Protocol) was ongoing, and it took many more years to get all the necessary building
blocks standardized. The foundational work on the SIP protocol was important for the work
in ECRIT because telephony providers wanted to use a standardized protocol they could
rely on and use as a replacement for their circuit-switched telephony technology. This shift
from circuit-switched networks to IP-based VoIP services took place for several reasons,
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including:
1. Lower capital expenses due to the commodity nature and increased competition,
2. Lower operational expenses of IP-based VoIP infrastructure,
3. Future-proofing because the rest of the industry moved to IP as well, and
4. Increased functionality and better extensibility.
The transition to IP-based networking and VoIP allows an emergency services author-
ities to connect PSAPs with each other and to reroute calls. Rerouting can happen for
various reasons, including load balancing, better utilizing call taker skills (e.g., language
skills), rerouting incorrectly routed calls, use of conference bridging capabilities, distribut-
ing technical functionality (e.g., separating the handling of vehicular emergency calls from
emergency calls using instant messaging and real-time text), etc. Furthermore, multimedia
data from end devices as well as from service providers can be distributed to entities along
the emergency services chain, such as first responders, to improve situational awareness.
The transition to an all-IP-based emergency services network is also used to rethink the
established emergency services organization. As a result, the existing processes and organi-
zational structures were simplified, typically leading to a reduction in the number of PSAPs
while accomplishing the same mission.
1.2. Research Challenges
At the time work on this thesis began, IP-based emergency services were at an early state
of deployment. Proprietary and standardized voice-over-IP solutions were available and
deployed but they typically did not offer emergency services capabilities 1. If emergency
services support was provided by a VoIP service provider, it was through interconnection
with the public switched telephone network (PSTN) because none of the PSAPs were IP
capable at that time.
The requirements for an IP-based emergency services architecture had been finalized in
the IETF ECRIT working group, with contributions from a wide range of stakeholders when
this thesis was started. Due to the differences between the VoIP and the circuit-switched
architecture, it was clear that an IP-based emergency services architecture would have to be
redesigned; just copying the concepts from the circuit-switched world was not possible.
1Emergency services support, at a minimum, means to have the possibility to dial an emergency number to
reach a call taker at a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP).
3 1.3. Thesis Contributions
First, an IP-based emergency services architecture had to be designed. As part of this
architecture, a protocol for mapping service identifiers and geodetic or civic location in-
formation to service contact URIs had to be developed. This protocol had to be flexible
enough to work in different deployment scenarios while also offering performance to be
used in an emergency services context. There was a question about feasibility and whether
the performance expectations could be met.
Second, security and privacy had to be considered during the design because emergency
services are critical infrastructure. With an increasing amount of attacks against IP-based
services, there was the concern that the transition to IP-based emergency services would
make the new infrastructure more vulnerable and fragile.
Third, multimedia-based emergency calling had to be supported. In addition to voice,
video, instant messaging, and real-time text, more advanced forms of emergency services
also had to be offered. The concept of a data-only emergency call was born with the in-
troduction of emergency services triggered by Internet of Things (IoT) devices, including
vehicles. Special attention had to be paid to the security of IoT devices interacting with
emergency services.
1.3. Thesis Contributions
This dissertation discusses an IP-based emergency services architecture ”to ensure that ev-
eryone has access to emergency services anytime, anywhere, from any device”2.
The contributions of this dissertation are threefold:
1. The IP-based emergency services architecture required a robust way to route emergency
calls to the appropriate PSAPs. The Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) protocol
was developed to provide this functionality. I am a co-author of the LoST technical spec-
ification, which has been verified with an implementation. The LoST specification has
been published in RFC 5222. Details about the implementation including a performance
analysis can be found in Appendix A. The performance analysis illustrated that the LoST
protocol can be used on devices without negatively impacting emergency services dis-
patch in terms of latency for call setup.
2. Improving the security properties of the architecture was important, which lead to the
2Access to emergency services anytime, anywhere and from any device is the stated goal of the National
Emergency Number Association (NENA), an emergency services association with more than 9,000 members
in 48 chapters across the United States and around the globe [1].
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development of various technical specifications and the publication of research papers
on the security and privacy of the developed IP-based emergency services architecture.
Security mechanisms have been added to the standardized protocols to the greatest extent
possible, while the consequences of certain attacks, such as DDoS attacks against first
responders, have been highlighted.
3. As the field of emergency services has been expanded to support more than just voice
with the addition of data-only emergency services capabilities, I have contributed several
technical specifications on Internet of Things security. An initial survey of standardized
IoT security protocols has been published in [2], and has recently been updated [3]. The
latest survey concludes that “standardization work has advanced to a point that there is
typically no need for homegrown solutions”. The article does, however, also acknowledge
that implementations lag behind standardization and some standardization efforts are still
ongoing. The lack of a firmware update mechanism for low-end IoT devices has been
a security challenge in many IoT deployments. Firmware update mechanism allows for
upgrades to these devices with new emergency services features and protocols. In [4] we
asked ourselves whether it is possible to create a secure, standards-compliant firmware
update solution that uses state-of-the-art crypto for low-end IoT devices. While this is one
of the currently ongoing standardization efforts, the article concludes that incorporating
a secure firmware update solution is possible with IoT devices that have as little as 32kB
of RAM and 128kB of flash memory. Such low-end devices would, however, not offer
multi-media support but rather data-only functionality.
The contributions of this dissertation have been published in the following articles:
1. H. Schulzrinne, H. Tschofenig, A. Newton, and T. Hardie, LOST: A PROTOCOL FOR
MAPPING GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS TO PUBLIC SAFETY ANSWERING POINTS, Pro-
ceedings of the 26th IEEE International Performance Computing and Communications
Conference, IPCCC 2007, April 11-13, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana.
2. H. Tschofenig, H. Schulzrinne, M. Shanmugam, and A. Newton, PROTECTING FIRST-
LEVEL RESPONDER RESOURCES IN AN IP-BASED EMERGENCY SERVICES ARCHI-
TECTURE, Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Performance Computing and Com-
munications Conference, IPCCC 2007, April 11-13, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana.
3. H. Tschofenig, M. Arumaithurai, H. Schulzrinne, and B. Aboba, HOW SECURE IS THE
NEXT GENERATION OF IP-BASED EMERGENCY SERVICES ARCHITECTURE?, Inter-
national Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (Elsevier), Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages
41-50, May 2010.
4. S. Keoh, S. Kumar, and H. Tschofenig, SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS: A
STANDARDIZATION PERSPECTIVE, IEEE Internet of Things Journal, June 2014.
5. H. Tschofenig, and E. Baccelli, CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE MASSES: SUR-
VEY OF THE IP PROTOCOL SUITE FOR IOT SECURITY, IEEE IoT Security & Privacy,
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1.4. Thesis Organization
The work on the IETF emergency services architecture evolved as shown in Figure 1.1,
which is also how this dissertation is organized3. From a set of requirements an architecture
was derived and a solution design developed. The solution consists of functionality for
multi-media emergency calls, vehicular emergency calls and data-only emergency calls.
Mechanisms for ensuring proper security and privacy properties cut accross the design of
all mechanisms.
Figure 1.1.: Thesis Organization.
Chapter 2 gives a high-level overview of the requirements and points to requirements
3Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are based on publicatications listed above. The text of the publications
had been modified to accomodate the different focus.
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documents published by the IETF ECRIT group. These requirements served as the starting
point for this thesis. The section concludes with a description of what is outside the scope
of this thesis because the field of emergency services is huge.
Chapter 5 describes the IETF emergency services architecture, which was developed
based on the requirements in Chapter 2. This chapter also provides an overview of the
solution components and explains how the Location to Service Translation (LoST) protocol
fits into this architecture. LoST is a key building block for routing emergency calls in the
IETF emergency services architecture and Appendix A provides details on the implementa-
tion and a performance analysis.
Chapter 6 explores security and privacy aspects of the architecture described in Chapter 5
and explains what security mitigation techniques are available.
Chapter 7 surveys ways to secure IoT devices used in data-only emergency calls. The
resulting survey has applicability beyond the field of emergency services. With the advances
in standardization and research more technologies are available not only for communication
security but also for securing the lifecycle of IoT devices, including firmware updates.
Other solution designs for an IP-based emergency services architecture have been devel-
oped as well. Chapter 3 describes those alternative architectures, namely NENA i2, ETSI
M493, DNS-SOS, and the 3GPP IMS. While these architectures re-use some of the techni-
cal building blocks developed during this thesis they utilize them in a different arrangement.
Chapter 4 compares the IETF emergency services architecture against these alternatives.
Chapter 8 summarizes this thesis and discusses future work.
1.5. Standards Contributions
A functioning emergency services system requires standardized protocols and procedures.
During the work on this thesis I have co-authored the following technical specifications:
1. B. Rosen, H. Schulzrinne, H. Tschofenig, and R. Gellens, DATA-ONLY EMERGENCY
CALLS, draft-ietf-ecrit-data-only-ea-18 (work in progress), Apr. 2019.
2. R. Gellens, and H. Tschofenig, NEXT-GENERATION PAN-EUROPEAN ECALL, IETF
RFC 8147 (Standards Track), May 2017.
3. R. Gellens, B. Rosen, and H. Tschofenig, NEXT-GENERATION VEHICLE-INITIATED
EMERGENCY CALLS, IETF RFC 8148 (Standards Track), May 2017.
7 1.5. Standards Contributions
4. R. Gellens, B. Rosen, H. Tschofenig, R. Marshall, and J. Winterbottom, ADDITIONAL
DATA RELATED TO AN EMERGENCY CALL, IETF RFC 7852 (Standards Track), July
2016.
5. J. Winterbottom, H. Tschofenig, and L. Liess, A ROUTING REQUEST EXTENSION FOR
THE HTTP-ENABLED LOCATION DELIVERY (HELD) PROTOCOL, IETF RFC 7840
(Standards Track), May 2016.
6. H. Schulzrinne, S. McCann, G. Bajko, H. Tschofenig, and D. Kroeselberg, EXTENSIONS
TO THE EMERGENCY SERVICES ARCHITECTURE FOR DEALING WITH UNAUTHEN-
TICATED AND UNAUTHORIZED DEVICES, IETF RFC 7406 (Informational), Dec. 2014.
7. H. Tschofenig, H. Schulzrinne, B. Aboba, TRUSTWORTHY LOCATION, IETF RFC 7378
(Informational), Dec. 2014.
8. J. Peterson, H. Schulzrinne, H. Tschofenig, SECURE TELEPHONE IDENTITY PROBLEM
STATEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS, IETF RFC 7340 (Informational), Sep. 2014.
9. H. Schulzrinne, H. Tschofenig, C. Holmberg, and M. Patel, PUBLIC SAFETY ANSWER-
ING POINT (PSAP) CALLBACK, IETF RFC 7090 (Standards Track), Apr. 2014.
10. R. Barnes, M. Thomson, J. Winterbottom, and H. Tschofenig, LOCATION CONFIGURA-
TION EXTENSIONS FOR POLICY MANAGEMENT, IETF RFC 7199 (Standards Track),
Apr. 2014.
11. J. Peterson, O. Kolkman, H. Tschofenig and B. Aboba, ARCHITECTURAL CONSIDER-
ATIONS ON APPLICATION FEATURES IN THE DNS, IETF RFC 6950 (Informational),
Oct. 2013.
12. J. Winterbottom, H. Tschofenig, H. Schulzrinne, M. Thomson, A LOCATION DEREF-
ERENCE PROTOCOL USING HTTP-ENABLED LOCATION DELIVERY (HELD), IETF
RFC 6753 (Standard Track), Oct. 2012.
13. H. Schulzrinne, H. Tschofenig, SYNCHRONIZING SERVICE BOUNDARIES AND ELE-
MENTS BASED ON THE LOCATION-TO-SERVICE TRANSLATION (LOST) PROTOCOL,
IETF RFC 6739 (Experimental), Oct. 2012.
14. R. Mahy, B. Rosen, H. Tschofenig, FILTERING LOCATION NOTIFICATIONS IN THE SES-
SION INITIATION PROTOCOL (SIP), IETF RFC 6447 (Standards Track), Jan. 2012.
15. H. Schulzrinne, L. Liess, H. Tschofenig, B. Stark, and A. Kuett, LOCATION HIDING:
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS, IETF RFC 6444 (Informational), Jan.
2012.
16. R. Barnes, M. Lepinski, A. Cooper, J. Morris, H. Tschofenig, H. Schulzrinne, AN AR-
CHITECTURE FOR LOCATION AND LOCATION PRIVACY IN INTERNET APPLICATIONS,
IETF RFC 6280/BCP 160 (Best Current Practice), Jul. 2011.
17. J. Winterbottom, M. Thomson, H. Tschofenig, R. Barnes, USE OF DEVICE IDENTITY IN
HTTP-ENABLED LOCATION DELIVERY (HELD), IETF RFC 6155 (Standards Track),
Mar. 2011.
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18. J. Fischl, H. Tschofenig, E. Rescorla. FRAMEWORK FOR ESTABLISHING A SECURE
REAL-TIME TRANSPORT PROTOCOL (SRTP) SECURITY CONTEXT USING DATA-
GRAM TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY (DTLS), IETF RFC 5763 (Standards Track),
May 2010.
19. H. Tschofenig, and H. Schulzrinne, GEOPRIV LAYER 7 LOCATION CONFIGURATION
PROTOCOL: PROBLEM STATEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS, IETF RFC 5687 (Informa-
tional), Mar. 2010.
20. H. Schulzrinne, V. Singh, H. Tschofenig, M. Thomson, DYNAMIC EXTENSIONS TO THE
PRESENCE INFORMATION DATA FORMAT LOCATION OBJECT (PIDF-LO), IETF RFC
5962 (Standards Track), Sep. 2010.
21. H. Tschofenig, Ed., F. Adrangi, M. Jones, A. Lior, B. Aboba, CARRYING LOCATION
OBJECTS IN RADIUS AND DIAMETER, IETF RFC 5580 (Standards Track), Aug. 2009.
22. J. Winterbottom, M. Thomson, H. Tschofenig, GEOPRIV PRESENCE INFORMATION
DATA FORMAT LOCATION OBJECT (PIDF-LO) USAGE CLARIFICATION, CONSIDER-
ATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, IETF RFC 5491 (Standards Track), Mar. 2009.
23. H. Schulzrinne, J. Polk, H. Tschofenig, DISCOVERING LOCATION-TO-SERVICE
TRANSLATION (LOST) SERVERS USING THE DYNAMIC HOST CONFIGURATION
PROTOCOL (DHCP), IETF RFC 5223 (Standards Track), Aug. 2008.
24. T. Hardie, A. Newton, H. Schulzrinne, H. Tschofenig, LOST: A LOCATION-TO-
SERVICE TRANSLATION PROTOCOL, IETF RFC 5222 (Standards Track), Aug. 2008.
25. T. Taylor, Ed., H. Tschofenig, H. Schulzrinne, M. Shanmugam, SECURITY THREATS
AND REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY CALL MARKING AND MAPPING, IETF RFC
5069 (Informational), Jan. 2008.
The following additional publications have been issued during my PhD studies:
1. K. Zandberg, K. Schleiser, F. Acosta, H. Tschofenig, and E. Baccelli, SECURE
FIRMWARE UPDATES FOR CONSTRAINED IOT DEVICES USING OPEN STANDARDS:
A REALITY CHECK, IEEE Access, May 2019.
2. H. Schulzrinne and H. Tschofenig (Eds.), INTERNET PROTOCOL-BASED EMERGENCY
SERVICES, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., May 2013.
3. EENA4, EENA NEXT GENERATION 112 - LONG TERM DEFINITION, Apr. 2012.
Available at http://www.eena.org/uploads/gallery/files/pdf/eena_ng112_
longtermdefinition.pdf.
4. H. Tschofenig, SECURITY RISKS IN NEXT-GENERATION EMERGENCY SERVICES, in
Communications of the ACM, Volume 54 Issue 11, Pages 23-25, Nov. 2011.
4The EENA Next Generation 112 - Long Term Definition specification was created by the EENA Technical
Committee. I am listed on the contributors page of the document.
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5. NENA5, DETAILED FUNCTIONAL AND INTERFACE STANDARDS FOR THE NENA I3
SOLUTION - STAGE 3, NENA 08-003 v1, Jun. 2011. Available at https://www.nena.
org/?page=i3_Stage3.
6. H. Tschofenig and H. Schulzrinne, EMERGENCY SERVICES FOR INTERNET MULTIME-
DIA, in ”The Internet Protocol Journal”, Volume 13, No.4, Pages 2-17, Dec. 2010.
5The Detailed Functional and Interface Standards for the NENA i3 Solution - Stage 3 specification was
created by the NENA Long Term Definition Working Group. I am listed on the contributors page of the
document.

Chapter2
Requirements
RFC 5012 [5] captures a list of requirements developed by the IETF ECRIT working group
and defines the basic terminology for use with IP-based emergency services.
In total, 43 requirements have been identified, and these requirements are categorized
into four areas, namely
• 8 high-level requirements,
• 9 requirements related to the caller’s location,
• 9 requirements related to the emergency service identifier, and
• 17 requirements focused on the mapping protocol.
RFC 5012 also defines what a mapping protocol is:
The primary purpose of the mapping protocol is to produce a PSAP URI
drawn from a preferred set of URI schemes such as SIP or SIPS URIs, based
on both location information [6] and a service identifier in order to facilitate the
IP end-to-end completion of an emergency call. The (emergency) service iden-
tifier describes the emergency service, independent of the user interface mech-
anism, the signaling protocol that is used to reach the service, or the caller’s
geographic location.
LoST, which is described in detail in Chapter 5, is such a mapping protocol.
The following requirements, which were copied from RFC 5012, are worth highlighting
since they had a substantial impact on the design of the described IP-based emergency
services architecture and the LoST protocol.
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International applicability (see Re2 in [5]): Regional, political, and organizational
aspects MUST be considered during the design of protocols and protocol extensions that
support IP-based emergency calls. It must be possible for a device or software developed
or purchased in one country to place emergency calls in another country.
Distributed administration (see Re3 in [5]): Deployment of IP-based emergency
services MUST NOT depend on a single central administrative authority. The design of
the mapping protocol must make it possible to deploy and administer emergency calling
features on a regional or national basis without requiring coordination with other regions
or nations.
Multi-mode communication (see Re4 in [5]): IP-based emergency calls MUST sup-
port multiple communication modes, including, for example, audio, video, and text.
Anonymous mapping (see Re8 in [5]): The mapping protocol MUST NOT require
the true identity of the target for which the location information is attributed. Ideally,
no identity information is provided via the mapping protocol.
Incrementally deployable (see Ma3 in [5]): The mapping protocol MUST be de-
signed to support its incremental deployment.
Anywhere mapping (see Ma5 in [5]): The mapping protocol MUST support the abil-
ity to provide mapping information in response to an individual query from any (earthly)
location, regardless of where the mapping client is located, either geographically or by
network location. The mapping client, such as an Emergency Services Routing Proxy,
may not necessarily be anywhere close to the caller or the appropriate PSAP, but must
still be able to obtain mapping information.
RFC 5012 did not list requirements for callbacks from PSAPs, emergency calls by
unauthenticated and unauthorized devices, calls from vehicles (so-called eCalls or vehicle-
initiated emergency calls), and calls triggered by Internet of Things devices. These require-
ments were added later and can be found in the following publications:
PSAP Callback: The requirements and a problem statement for PSAP callback, which
arises from the need for the call taker to reach out to the caller for further information,
is described in RFC 7090 [7]. In some jurisdictions, support for offering preferential
treatment for PSAP callback is a regulatory requirement.
Emergency Calls from Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices: RFC 7406 [8]
introduces emergency services support for unauthenticated and unauthorized devices and
defines terminology. In some countries, support for such functionality is a regulatory
requirement (even though it makes the emergency services architecture more vulnerable
to attacks against the emergency services infrastructure and PSAP call taker resources in
particular).
Vehicle-initiated Emergency Calls: RFC 8148 [9] outlines the concept of vehicle-
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initiated emergency calling where emergency calls are triggered automatically by vehi-
cles in the event of a crash or serious incident, or manually invoked by a vehicle occupant.
In addition to voice and location data, these emergency calls may also convey information
generated by sensors.
Data-only Emergency Calls: Data-only emergency calls go one step further and allow
Internet of Things devices, such as temperature sensors, burglar alarms, or chemical spill
sensors, to communicate generic data to the emergency services infrastructure, as ex-
plained in [10].
While the previously referenced documents all come with a description of security threats
and requirements, a dedicated security threat and requirements document has been pub-
lished in RFC 5069 [11]. Many of the attacks concern the use of the mapping protocol so
that an attacker is unable to
• inject fake messages,
• mount denial-of-service attacks,
• impersonate the mapping architecture towards other emergency services entities,
• eavesdrop on the communication.
Requirements for communicating location by reference (LbyR), which is a feature of-
fered in addition to the basic location by value (LbyV), were published in RFC 5808 [12].
LbyR offers performance benefits in mobile environments and can also help to improve ac-
cess control and increase privacy protection. A protocol for requesting and receiving LbyR
is needed, however, and the requirements for such a protocol are discussed in a separate
publication, namely RFC 5687 [13].
Finally, requirements for hiding location information are outlined in RFC 6444 [14].
Location hiding aims to address cases where Internet Access Providers (IAPs) and Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) want to withhold precise location information from the endpoint
and from the VSP. There are several reasons for the desire to restrict access to location
information, which are described in Section 1.2 of [14], and the privacy benefit is only one
of the reasons.
Emergency services is a broad field and not every topic is covered in this thesis. The
following topics are outside the scope:
• communication from the PSAP towards the first responders using non-IP-based commu-
nication,
• authority-to-citizen emergency calling, which is also known as ’early warning’,
• any form of social networks for disaster recovery,
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• communication between first responders,
• the use of legacy infrastructure for emergency services, and
• details about the underlying communication infrastructures (e.g., radio networks).
Chapter3
Related Work
The work in this thesis focuses on the emergency services architecture described in [15].
However, other solutions have been proposed as well, and in this chapter the most popular
approaches are described.
3.1. NENA i2
NENA i2 was designed with the intention to allow emergency calls placed from VoIP phones
to reach legacy PSAPs. It was developed as a transition architecture towards NENA i3,
which is an all-IP-based emergency services architecture. To support VoIP emergency ser-
vices, additional functionality had to be added to the VoIP service provider and the VoIP
Positioning Center (VPC) was introduced as a support infrastructure.
NENA i2 was developed by the National Emergency Number Association (NENA),
which is ”an organization whose mission it is to foster the technological advancement,
availability, and implementation of a universal emergency telephone number system in the
United States” [16]. The United States has a unique emergency services infrastructure with
more than 6,000 PSAPs. Due to the large number of PSAPs, the impression among the
designers of NENA i2 was that it would be simpler to upgrade the VoIP service provider
infrastructure rather than the PSAP infrastructure.
Figure 3.1 shows a simplified version of the architecture graphically. The different de-
ployment variants for the VoIP service provider, which allow outsourcing of functionality
as well as the use of redirect servers and routing proxies, are not shown. NENA i2 is de-
scribed in detail in the NENA i2 technical specification [17,18] and summarized in Section
3.1 of [19].
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Figure 3.1.: NENA i2 Architecture (Simplified)
Call routing in NENA i2 is intended to allow a VoIP service provider to find a suitable
Emergency Services Gateway (ESGW), which then routes the call using the legacy tele-
phony infrastructure to a legacy PSAP. The PSAP needs several information items about a
caller, including location, a callback number and subscriber information. Figure 3.1 explic-
itly highlights the transmission of location information only. Since the legacy infrastructure
does not allow location information to be conveyed in-band with the call-signaling mes-
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sages, a separate lookup procedure by the PSAP is necessary. This query is addressed to
the so-called Automatic Location Identification (ALI), which itself needs to interact with
the Voice Positioning Center (VPC). The lookup key is the Emergency Services Query Key
(ESQK), which is one of the most important data structures used in the NENA i2 architec-
ture. The ESQK is a 10-digit number allocated by the VPC for a given emergency call. It
serves as a pointer to the location information, the callback number, and other information
maintained for a given emergency call. The ESQK is included in the call signaling message
towards the PSAP and subsequently used as a parameter in the query to the ALI/VPC. Con-
ceptually, it is similar to the location-by-reference scheme used by a Location Information
Server (LIS).
Since NENA i2 architecture focused on fixed and nomadic use of VoIP, which was the
primary form of VoIP deployment in 2003 when the work on the architecture was started,
civic location information was given special attention. Fixed emergency services in the
United States made use of a database called Master Street Address Guide (MSAG), which
was populated by the addressing authority of the relevant regions. Before a civic location
address could be used with emergency services, either for routing or for dispatch, it had to be
’MSAG validated’. An ’MSAG-validated’ address had to be checked against the addresses
of the MSAG database to ensure that the address corresponded to an entry in the database.
The NENA i2 architecture assigned the location server the task of verifying civic addresses
against the MSAG database, which was connected with the Validation Database (VDB).
The architecture assumed the possibility of the end device obtaining location information,
by value or by reference, from a local LIS. The VoIP service provider would then pass this
information on to the VPC, which would either interact with the LIS to resolve the location
reference (called Location Key) or use the provided location information directly for route
determination.
A final aspect that deserves discussion is the use of route determination so that the VoIP
service provider indeed finds the suitable entry point to the legacy infrastructure and to the
ESGW. As mentioned previously, the task of route determination was given to the VPC. The
VPC takes location information from the emergency caller’s device and routing information
from the Emergency Service Zone Routing Database (ERDB) as input. The ERDB stores
zone information and associates it with specific ESGWs. In response, the VPC returns
the Emergency Services Gateway Route Identifier (ESGWRI), which identifies the specific
ESGW as well as the route to the PSAP in the legacy network, in the form of a SIP URI.
The VPC also allocates the ESQK for use with the respective ESGW and provides it in the
response to the VoIP provider as well.
NENA i2 delegates the complex task of route determination to a single entity, the VPC.
The VPC essentially becomes a black box, and it is difficult to see how this architecture
would scale to the size of the Internet. Even the task of obtaining location information
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about the end device is unspecified since the interaction between the end device and the
VoIP service provider is outside the scope of the NENA i2 architecture. Enhancing the
existing database lookup scheme (at the ALI and the VPC) to utilize a new identifier (in the
form of the ESQK) is, however, a clever hack.
3.2. ETSI M493
The standardization work on emergency services within ETSI, the European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute, was created out of a mandate from the European Commission.
This mandate had the number 493 [20] and, as it happens often in Europe, ETSI felt the
need to start a standardization activity to fulfill the mandate. In their mandate the European
Commission observed that there are VoIP provides that are not 3GPP IMS providers and
that those are also required to provide emergency services support to their users. Location
information is required so that emergency call routing can take place. Additionally, the
ability to transfer location information to the PSAPs for dispatch is needed. The mandate
led to the formation of the ETSI M493 group, which first developed an architecture fol-
lowed by the protocol specifications. The architecture is published in [21] and the protocol
specification is available for download at [22].
Figure 3.2 shows a simplified version of the architecture graphically. Details about the
emergency services network, which the M493 architecture splits into the Emergency Call
Services Provider and the PSAP Service Provider, were omitted. Furthermore, various en-
tities in the emergency services network can query the Location Server, which is simplified
in the drawing. Unlike NENA i2, the architecture described in M493 particularly aims
to address cases where emergency services support is provided in one country while the
Voice Service Provider is operating in a different country. The interface between the user
equipment of the emergency caller and the Voice Service Provider is outside the scope of
the architecture. Quite naturally, this design decision forces the VoIP service provider to
interact with the access network provider and the emergency services infrastructure. Ad-
ditionally, M493 considers the case of IP-based PSAPs in addition to legacy non-IP-based
PSAPs, but focuses primarily on voice-based emergency calling.
The most essential part in the M493 architecture is the Location Server discovery com-
ponent that uses the source IP address (and source port) of the emergency call as the key for
the lookup procedure. RFC 7216 [23] standardizes the discovery steps, which are re-used in
the M493 protocol [22]. For cases in which intermediaries such as VPN gateways or TURN
servers are used along the media path, the discovery procedure would lead to incorrect re-
sults since the information in the network and transport headers is modified in transit. The
M493 architecture addresses this challenge and recommends that the discovery procedure
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Figure 3.2.: M493 Architecture (Simplified)
be applied in a nested (or chained) fashion. For more details see Appendix A of [21].
Once the Location Server has been discovered the Voice Service Provider uses the HTTP-
Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) [24–27] protocol or the Diameter protocol [28] to inter-
act with the Location Server. HELD was initially designed to obtain location information,
by value or by reference, but was later extended to also return emergency services call
routing information [27].
According to the M493 specification, HELD shall be used when no pre-established rela-
tionship exists between the Voice Service Provider and the Access Network Provider. When
a pre-established relationship exists then the M493 specification allows Diameter, as spec-
ified in ETSI ES 283 035 [29], to be used as an alternative solution. Civic and geospatial
location information is conveyed as defined in IETF RFC 4776 [30], IETF RFC 3825 [31],
or as a Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO) defined in IETF RFC
4119 [6].
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3.3. DNS-SOS
With the DNS-SOS proposals [32] Brian Rosen (Neustar) suggested to using a DNS-based
mechanism to lookup emergency calling URIs and related emergency information. The
proposal assumes a new root, sos.arpa, to be maintained by an international organization
that then uses country-level agencies to manage the next-lower level in the hierarchy. For
example, at.sos.arpa would be maintained by an Austrian agency, which can then make
further delegations for individual states, and cities, if necessary.
DNS-SOS makes use of the Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) frame-
work [33], which is a generic mechanism for storing application data in the DNS. This
requires a client-side algorithm for transforming a string into a domain name, which is sub-
sequently resolved by the DNS to retrieve Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) Resource
Record records [33–36]. In this proposal the input is location information, which is then
transformed into a so-called Application Unique String. This solution, as RFC 6950 [37]
explains, allows the resolution of identifiers, such as telephone numbers or location infor-
mation, that do not have a recognizable domain component to be treated as domain names
for use with the DNS.
A NAPTR record contains the following structures:
• two different weighting mechanisms (”order” and ”preference”),
• a ”service” field (such as ’sos+police’) to express the application the NAPTR record de-
scribes,
• a ”replacement” field or a ”regular expression” field, which performs the translation.
Examples of NAPTR records can be seen in Figure 3.3.
The labels of the Application Unique String follow the civic location structure defined
in [30, 38, 39]. This means that the string is expressed as a series of concatenated civic
location tokens whereby tokens are separated by a period. For example, the application
unique string ’innsbruck.tirol.at.sos.arpa’ indicates that the encoded civic address is in the
city of “Innsbruck”, in the state of “Tirol”, and in the country of “Austria”. The exact
canonicalization algorithm is not provided in the proposal. To take spelling variations into
account Brian Rosen including alternative spellings in databases as well. When certain civic
tokens from the hierarchy must be omitted, they would be expressed by the ’.null’ value.
To form an Application Unique String using geodetic location information the proposal
suggests to express latitude, longitude, and altitude by concatenating these three values sep-
arated with a period. For example, 101d221.93d0345.0.geo.sos.arpa would be a geodetic
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location with 101.221 degrees latitude, 93.0354 degrees longitude, and no altitude informa-
tion6.
In addition to returning service URIs, the DNS-SOS proposal also envisions the following
metadata to be provided via NAPTR records:
• a URI to a document containing PSAP URIs and service boundaries (in the form of poly-
gons),
• a URI to a document containing subdomains. The aim of providing this information is
for searching, and
• a URI to a document containing building information. This information is meant to be
used by first responders rather than for emergency call routing purposes and may require
confidentiality protection and access control.
Using the subdomains in combination with the service boundaries would allow a DNS
server to respond to queries that include geodetic location information since the server can
collect the necessary information to use a point-in-polygon operation to determine which
PSAP to route the call to. However, the currently deployed DNS infrastructure does not
provide such functionality.
A more complete example of a fictional DNS configuration is shown in Figure 3.3. The
example has been taken from Section 6.2 of [41] and modified to illustrate the different
service types.
In response to the DNS-SOS proposal and related ideas to enhance the DNS with new
functionality, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) published RFC 6950 [37] to discuss the
architectural consequences of using the DNS to implement application features. Engineers
like to reuse the DNS infrastructure due to its widespread deployment.
However, the DNS may not be a suitable infrastructure for some applications, as pointed
out in RFC 6950. In the context of this proposal, the rules for processing requests of regular
DNS queries where a hostname is resolved to an IP address are quite different than the
resolution necessary to resolve location information together with a service identification
to a PSAP URI. In particular, the use of geodetic location information requires complex
location-matching procedures, which the deployed DNS infrastructure does not offer.
6The example has been taken from Section 10 of [32]. Note that the recommendations in Section 5.2.1 of
RFC 5491 [40] either require the coordinate reference system (CRS) WGS 84 to be used, or to at least indicate
a coordinate reference system.
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at.sos.arpa. PTR tirol.at.sos.arpa.
at.sos.arpa. PTR wien.at.sos.arpa.
us.sos.arpa. PTR salzburg.at.sos.arpa.
...
us.sos.arpa. PTR vorarlberg.at.sos.arpa.
tirol.at.sos.arpa. PTR innsbruck.tirol.at.sos.arpa.
tirol.at.sos.arpa. PTR hall.tirol.at.sos.arpa.
tirol.at.sos.arpa. PTR thaur.nj.us.sos.arpa.
...
tirol.at.sos.arpa. PTR rum.tirol.at.sos.arpa.
innsbruck.tirol.at.sos.arpa IN NAPTR
NAPTR 100 10 "u" "sos+fire"
"/.*/sips:fire@innsbruck.example.com".
NAPTR 100 10 "u" "sos+police"
"/.*/sips:police@innsbruck.example.com".
NAPTR 100 10 "u" "sos+mountain"
"/.*/sips:mountain@innsbruck.example.com".
NAPTR 100 10 "u" "sos+rescue"
"/.*/sips:rescue@innsbruck.example.com".
NAPTR 100 10 "u" "sos+PSAP"
"/.*/sips:sos@innsbruck.example.com".
...
Figure 3.3.: Example DNS-SOS Configuration.
3.4. 3GPP IMS
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is an architecture that has been developed by the 3GPP
to replace the circuit switched voice infrastructure and has been heavily influenced by its
primary customers, i.e., telecommunication operators. The important design decision in the
IMS architecture is that the Application Service Provider (ASP) and the Access Network
Provider (ANP)7 are operated by the same entity. This design decision simplified the lo-
7The term ‘Application Service Provider’ (ASP) is defined in RFC 5012 [5] and the term ‘Access Network
Provider’ (ANP) is defined in RFC 5687 [13]. The ANP is a combination of ‘Internet Access Provider’ (IAP)
and ‘Internet Service Provider (ISP)’, two additional terms defined in RFC 5012 [5]. Note that in some countries
there may be a split between the ISP and the IAP, but this separation is not relevant for the description of the
IMS emergency services architecture.
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cation retrieval and emergency call routing procedure because they happen locally within
the visited network. The designers of the IMS architecture also wanted to offer quality of
service (QoS) mechanisms for emergency services, as explained in Section 3.6 of [19]. De-
signing a QoS solution that operates locally is deployable when the application functionality
is offered by the network operator.
Gaining access to most networks requires successful completion of the network access
authentication procedures. Extra steps had to be added to accommodate cases where the
end device8 either has no credentials to authenticate to the network or is otherwise not
able to perform a successful network access authentication (for example, when there are no
roaming agreements or the subscription is not valid).
Figure 3.4 shows a simplified version of the architecture graphically. The main entities in
this diagrams are SIP entities, such as the various forms of Call Session Control Functions
(CSCFs). CSCFs are SIP servers or proxies. The Emergency Call Session Control Func-
tion (E-CSCF) is an entity introduced to provide emergency call handling functionality. It
interacts with the Location Retrieval Function (LRF) and communicates with the PSAP in
the emergency services network either directly for IP-enabled PSAPs or indirectly via the
Border Gateway Control Function (BGCF) and a Media Gateway (MGW) in the case of
legacy PSAPs, and focuses on voice- and multi-media signaling exchanges using SIP with
the UE detecting the emergency call. The figure does not describe the underlying radio and
network attachment procedures. The IMS specifications distinguish the case where the UE
is roaming, as shown in Figure 3.4, whereas it is not. In the roaming case, the emergency
call is not routed to the home network but instead processed locally via the E-CSCF in
what is called a “local breakout”. In the roaming case an emergency registration is typically
used (unless, for example, it is lacking credentials). The Serving CSCF (S-CSCF), which is
located in the home network, is contacted during emergency registration. The Interrogating-
CSCF (I-CSCF) is at the edge of the administrative domain and relays communication to
the S-CSCF. Non-emergency calls are home routed, and emergency call handling therefore
presents an exception in the IMS architecture. Emergency registration uses the “sos” ser-
vice URN [42] and ensures that a PSAP can initiate a callback, though the PSAP callback
itself is not shown in the figure. The Proxy CSCF (P-CSCF), which is the first point of
contact for an IMS terminal, must also be provisioned with emergency service URNs and
emergency numbers to detect an emergency call from the IMS terminal so that the E-CSCF
can be selected and call setups forwarded to it. After the SIP call establishment is complete,
voice communication can be initiated, and as shown in Figure 3.4 a gateway may be used
to translate the call to the PSTN.
8The 3GPP uses the terms ‘User Equipment’ (UE) for a mobile IMS phone with a (U)SIM and ‘Mobile
Equipment’ (ME) for a phone without a (U)SIM and therefore no subscription.
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Figure 3.4.: IMS Architecture (Simplified)
Chapter4
Comparison
The requirements outlined in Chapter 2 lead to the development of the IETF emergency
services architecture and the design of the LoST protocol, as described in Chapter 5. In this
chapter a comparison between the IETF emergency services architecture and the alternatives
i.e. NENA i2, ETSI M493, DNS-SOS, and 3GPP IMS, is provided.
4.1. NENA i2
NENA i2 is an early transition solution and lacks many of the features later demanded.
International applicability: NENA i2 was designed specifically for the United States
with applicability to Canada. Architecture focused on fixed and nomadic use of VoIP and
on the interworking with legacy PSAPs only.
Distributed administration: Route determination is provided by the VoIP Positioning
Center (VPC), which interfaces the Emergency Services Zone Routing Data Base (ERDB)
and the Location Information Server (LIS).
Multi-mode communication: Focus of the architecture is on voice, particularly regard-
ing the interworking with legacy PSAPs. Hence, there is no support for multi-mode
communication.
Anonymous mapping: The VPC uses the caller’s location as input to the route deter-
mination process. It does not need the caller’s identity but the VSP provides customer
information to the VPC in order to make it available to the PSAP. Therefore, no anony-
mous mapping is provided.
Incrementally deployable: The architecture is meant to be deployable in selected coun-
tries. It does, however, require the end devices to support the interaction with a LIS to
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obtain location information by value or by reference. Without this location support the
described architecture cannot be deployed incrementally even within a single country.
Anywhere mapping: Although not explicitly stated, the VPC is likely to interact only
with authorized VSPs. Furthermore, the ERDB is only accessible by the VPC. As such,
the VPC/ERDB are not able to provide mapping information in response to an individual
query from any location.
PSAP callback: NENA i2 provides PSAP callback support based on the callback number
stored by the VSP although without the security properties described in RFC 7090 [7].
Emergency calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices: NENA i2 does
not support emergency calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices.
Vehicle-initiated emergency calling support: NENA i2 does not discuss Vehicle-
initiated emergency calling.
Data-Only emergency calls: NENA i2 does not discuss data-only emergency calls.
4.2. ETSI M493
ETSI M493 has been developed long after NENA i2 and takes advantage of some of the
more advanced IETF standardization work. The architecture also takes deployments into
account where the VSP is not offering IMS-based services. The focus on network operators
offering both location information and route determination is a strong requirement.
International applicability: ETSI M493 was the result of a mandate by the European
Commission and applicability is within the EU member states. It considers legacy PSAPs
as well as IP-based PSAPs.
Distributed administration: Access network providers and Emergency Call Service
Providers have to closely cooperate in a single country since location and route deter-
mination is provided by the access network providers.
Multi-mode communication: Focus of the architecture is on voice, but video and text
support is also mentioned.
Anonymous mapping: The LS does not require caller information to perform a map-
ping. As such, anonymous mappings are provided.
Incrementally deployable: The architecture requires a strong cooperation between
VSPs and access network providers since the VSP has to determine the correct Location
Server (LS) based on information in the network layer (in most cases the IP address).
There is no dependency on the end device in this architecture, at least conceptually.
Anywhere mapping: The LS can only provide mapping information in response to an
query from an emergency caller of the access network provider that operates the LS.
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ETSI M493 anticipates that a LS may interact with other LSs, for example in case of
VPN scenarios. Whether this concept indeed works in practice is unknown.
PSAP callback: Details about PSAP callback are not described.
Emergency calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices: ETSI M493
does not support emergency calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices.
Vehicle-initiated emergency calling support: ETSI M493 does not discuss Vehicle-
initiated emergency calling.
Data-Only emergency calls: ETSI M493 does not discuss data-only emergency calls.
4.3. DNS-SOS
DNS-SOS was an early attempt to untangle location determination from route determination
in a way that it can be deployed internationally. Re-using the DNS infrastructure was clever
but also revealed a number of problems. Since the proposal was discontinued in favor of
LoST only a sub-set of the features are summarized below.
International applicability: DNS-SOS was meant to be used internationally, similarly
to the DNS.
Distributed administration: DNS-SOS allows distributed administration. For geodetic
location information the proposal was underspecified and prevented the use of the regular
DNS infrastructure due to the new search and matching procedure. The single root of
the DNS infrastructure may, however, make deployments in certain regions more difficult
(particularly when there is a dispute over a geographical region).
Anonymous mapping: DNS-SOS allows anonymous mapping.
Incrementally deployable: DNS-SOS is incrementally deployable and the civic map-
ping is certainly easier to deploy even though new DNS infrastructure elements are re-
quired. At the time when the DNS-SOS proposal was made the DNS offered very few
security mechanisms, which may have negatively impacted its deployment (as it was seen
with other DNS extensions).
Anywhere mapping: It was envisioned that DNS-SOS allows mapping from anywhere.
4.4. 3GPP IMS
The 3GPP IMS emergency services architecture is an advanced IP-based communication
system developed for network operators who are also offering voice over IP services. As
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such, the classical telecommunication operators are the main audience for an IMS-based
system.
International applicability: The 3GPP IMS is applicable to IMS-based systems only. It
is internationally applicable once network operators in all countries deploy IMS. In the
meanwhile those devices will fall back to PSTN-based emergency calling. Non-IMS-
based service providers are excluded from emergency services support.
Distributed administration: The assumption of the IMS architecture is that the Appli-
cation Service Provider (ASP) and the Access Network Provider (ANP) are operated by
a single company, or are in close relationship. As such, route and location determination
is accomplished by the same entity.
Multi-mode communication: IMS aims to support voice, video and text.
Anonymous mapping: Anonymous mappings are possible when the emergency caller
has not been authenticated by the network. In all other cases the involved IMS entities
have information about the calling party.
Incrementally deployable: With the legacy emergency call support the 3GPP IMS ar-
chitecture is incrementally deployable. Support for IMS does, however, require support
from the network
Anywhere mapping: In IMS an emergency caller can only expect route determination
provided by the IMS entities in the access network. As such, there is no need for a
mapping to be provided by a non-local entity.
PSAP callback: Functionality for PSAP callback is provided.
Emergency calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices: Emergency
calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices is supported.
Vehicle-initiated emergency calling support: Vehicle-initiated emergency calls are
supported.
Data-Only emergency calls: Data-only emergency calls are supported theoretically but
are not described.
Table 4.1 compares NENA i2, ETSI M493, 3GPP IMS and the IETF emergency services
architectures against each other. As it can be seen, the IETF emergency services architec-
ture using LoST is the most versatile architecture and various emergency services features
developed for the IETF architecture have subsequently been re-used in other architectures
as well.
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Feature NENA i2 ETSI M493 3GPP IMS IETF
International applicability N P F F
Distributed administration N P P F
Multi-mode communication N P F F
Anonymous mapping N F P F
Anymous location N F P F
Incrementally deployable N P F F
Anywhere mapping N P N F
PSAP callback P ND F F
Emergency calls from unauthenticated and unauthorized devices ND ND F F
Vehicle-initiated emergency calling support ND ND F F
Data-Only emergency calls ND ND ND F
Signaling security ND ND F F
Media security ND ND F F
Support for non-IMS end devices F F N F
Support for non-SIP end devices F F F F
Table 4.1.: Emergency Services Architecture Solution Comparison.
Legend:
Fully supported (F)
Partially supported (P)
Not supported (N)
Not described (ND)

Chapter5
An IP-based Emergency Services
Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows the vision of an IP-enabled emergency services architecture graphically.
The left side of the picture shows end devices attached to different access networks and
communication service providers. In the Internet many applications are provided by com-
panies independent from the access network operator and therefore the separation between
the access network and the communication service provider is indicated explicitly whereas
in the circuit switched telephony world the application functionality was provided by the ac-
cess network operator. The right side of Figure 5.1 depicts the IP-based emergency services
network. The developed technical specifications focus on both sides and use the Session Ini-
tiation Protocol (SIP). While other protocols have been developed in the meanwhile, such as
XMPP, RTCWeb, and many proprietary protocols, they have never received the same atten-
tion from the emergency services community. Consequently, emergency services standards
are primarily available for SIP-based deployments.
In addition to phones, which have typically been used to place emergency calls, other
devices have been used to communicate information relevant for emergency calls, including
Internet of Things devices that offer sensor data (such as smoke detectors), audio and video
information. The ability of placing emergency calls by vehicles has also extended the ability
to summon help faster and to provide more detailed information about the incident to the
call taker and first responders.
By design, these non-SIP-based communication architectures can, however, also be sup-
ported and Figure 5.1 just refers to them as originating networks. Three core features must
be provided by these originating networks in order to interwork smoothly with the standard-
ized IP-based emergency services infrastructure:
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Figure 5.1.: Communication Architecture Overviewa.
aCourtesy of Guy Caron, ENP
1. Ability to identify an emergency call.
2. Ability to communicate location and/or a location reference.
3. Ability to convey multi-media content.
These three core building blocks are described in more detail in Section 5.1. Some of the
communication architectures in use today provide support for this functionality, such as the
3GPP IMS architecture9, and the IETF SIP architecture. At the time of writing, there are
other communication architectures that do not yet support emergency services, such as the
Real-Time Communication in WEB-browsers [43] and the Extensible Messaging and Pres-
ence Protocol (XMPP) [44]. There are also many non-standardized and proprietary com-
munication architectures, such as Skype R©, and many smart phone messaging apps (such as
WhatsApp).
Although it seems counterproductive to have many different communication architec-
tures the reason for their existence is manifold. The history and background of the persons
designing the different communication architectures often had a huge influence on the out-
come. In many cases business models dictate design decisions of the work in different
standards developing organizations. The following paragraph describes one such design
9The 3GPP IMS architecture uses the SIP protocol family as a foundation and is a variant of the more
generic IETF SIP architecture.
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differentiator.
The Internet architecture follows a layered design, which is a common design pattern
for communication systems in general, and allows the replacement of different components
(such as one radio technology with another one) while only impacting the neighboring lay-
ers. In student textbooks, the Internet architecture has the data link layer, network layer,
transport layer, and the applications layer. In the real world, the layering is much more
complex, and it is sometimes hard to assign specific protocols to specific layers since pro-
tocols can be used in a very flexible way and are often tunneled inside other protocols.
The responsibility of providing implementations and deployments of certain layers is also
distributed to different parties. In many deployments, the provider of physical connectivity
(e.g., a wire or radio base stations) and the provider offering Internet connectivity are differ-
ent companies. Furthermore, those companies offering Internet connectivity are very often
different from those offering application layer services. This separation of functionality is
a consequence of the end-to-end principle rather than the layering alone. The end-to-end
principle states that end-to-end functions can best be realized by end-to-end protocols [45].
While the end-to-end principle still leaves room for discussion and interpretation, many ap-
plication deployments today happen independently of Internet connectivity deployments.
Those who provide Internet connectivity would like to provide applications as well, or at
least benefit from the deployment of the applications. Consequently, a design that assumes
that the Internet access provider also offers application services is different from a design
that assumes a separation between the two parties. Such fundamental design assumptions
lead to different communication architectures and consequently also to different designs for
the emergency services system even though it is possible to re-use the same building blocks.
The differences between XMPP-based, Skype R©-based, over-the-top SIP-based VoIP de-
ployments, and RTCWeb are, on the other hand, less dramatic. All three assume indepen-
dence of the application service provider from the Internet access provider. The differences
are mainly in the protocol choice. SIP is an IETF standard and is widely used for voice
traffic. Skype R© software, on the other hand, uses a proprietary protocol that only relies on
SIP for interconnecting with other non-Skype R©-based systems. XMPP is also an IETF pro-
tocol that has found widespread usage for instant messaging. RTCWeb is the most recent
standardization development that has been done by the IETF together with the W3C and
re-uses Web development programming paradigms that rely on JavaScript and JavaScript
APIs. For a discussion about the power of downloadable code, as provided by the Web
architecture, read [46].
The term smart phone app just refers to an implementation of some protocol. It does not
indicate whether a standardized or a proprietary protocol has been implemented. As such,
a smart phone app may be an implementation of any of the protocols listed above, such
as a SIP-based VoIP client. In many cases, however, smart phone apps contain proprietary
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communication protocol implementations.
5.1. Building Blocks
Recognizing Emergency Calls
In the early days of PSTN-based emergency calling, callers would dial a local number for
the fire or police department. It was recognized in the 1960s that trying to find this number
in an emergency caused unacceptable delays. Thus, most countries have been introducing
single nationwide emergency numbers, such as 9-1-1 in North America and 1-1-2 in all
countries of the European Union. This became even more important as mobile devices
started to replace landline phones. As it can be seen from the introduction of 1-1-2 in
Europe this education effort takes many years and the old emergency numbers are therefore
still in use today (in addition the European-wide 1-1-2 number).
In many countries, different types of emergency services, such as police or mountain
rescue, are still identified by separate numbers. Unfortunately, there are more than 60 dif-
ferent emergency numbers in use worldwide, many of which also have non-emergency uses
in other countries, so that simply storing the list of numbers in all devices is not feasible.
Furthermore, hotels, university campuses, and larger enterprises often use dial prefixes, so
that an emergency caller has to dial 0-1-1-2 to reach the fire department when making a call
from a landline phone on premise.
With the introduction of smart phones new user interface designs emerged as well. Some
devices may use dedicated emergency calling buttons or similar user interface elements to
initiate an emergency call. Such mechanisms need to be carefully designed so that they are
not accidentally triggered, e.g., when the device is in a pocket.
Instead of conveying the actual dial string in a protocol message once the user has entered
it, a symbolic representation is used instead. This allows unambiguous emergency call iden-
tification and automatic treatment of calls by VoIP call handling software. The mechanism
used for this emergency call marking uses the Uniform Resource Names (URNs) defined in
RFC 5031 [42], such as urn:service.sos.
Obtaining and Conveying Location Information
Location information is needed by emergency services for three reasons: routing the
call to a PSAP that is closest to the emergency caller, dispatching first responders (e.g.,
policemen or ambulance) to the location of the emergency, and determining the emergency
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service dial strings that are supported in a specific area. It is obvious that location has
to be determined automatically for the first and third purpose. Experience has shown that
automated, highly accurate location information is vital to dispatching as well, rather than
relying on the caller to report his or her location to the call taker. This increases accuracy
and avoids dispatch delays when the caller is unable to provide location information due to
language barriers, lack of familiarity with his or her surroundings, stress, physical or mental
impairment. For this reason, automatic location determination and location conveyance for
emergency calls are important requirements in nearly all countries.
Location information for emergency purposes comes in two representations: (a) geospa-
tial (or also called geodetic), e.g., longitude and latitude, and (b) civic, e.g., street addresses
similar to postal addresses. For indoor location vertical information (floor level) is very use-
ful. Civic locations are utilized for fixed Internet access, including wireless hot spots, and
are often preferable for specifying indoor locations in complex buildings, while geodetic
location is frequently used for mobile devices, such as cell phones. However, with the in-
troduction of femto and pico cells civic location is feasible with mobile phones and accurate
geodetic information can be very hard to acquire indoors.
The requirements for location accuracy differ between routing and dispatch. For call
routing, city or even county-level accuracy is often enough, depending on how large the
PSAP service areas are, while first responders benefit greatly when they can pinpoint the
caller to a building or, better yet, apartment or office for indoor locations, and an outdoor
area of at most a few hundred meters outdoors. This avoids having to search multiple
buildings, e.g., for medical emergencies.
Various protocol mechanisms have been developed to obtain location information from
Location Servers. Devices without GPS may interact with these Location Servers and in cer-
tain cases even devices with GPS receivers may contact Location Servers to obtain verified
location information or for obtaining GPS-based location information faster using server-
provided assistence data. Chapter 5 discusses various location protocols that have been
developed to allow the calling device, the PSAP, or some other proxy on behalf of them to
request location information.
Routing Emergency Calls
Once an emergency call is recognized, the call needs to be routed to the appropriate
PSAP. Each PSAP is only responsible for a limited geographic region, its service region.
In addition to the geographical region different PSAPs often only provide their service for
specific services, such as police, fire, ambulance, etc. There is a wide range of different de-
ployment models used throughout the world and a description of the different PSAP models
for Europe can be found in [47, 48].
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The number of PSAPs serving a country varies quite a bit. Sweden, for example, has 18
PSAPs and the United States approximately 6,200 (at the time of writing). Therefore, there
is roughly one PSAP per 500.000 inhabitants in Sweden and one per 50.000 in the US. As
all-IP infrastructure is rolled out, smaller PSAPs may be consolidated into regional PSAPs.
Emergency calls are primarily routed based on the emergency caller’s location informa-
tion. Routing may also take place in multiple stages taking factors, such as the number of
available call takers, the load situation of a PSAP, supported media (such as voice, real-time
text), or the language capabilities of the call takers into account. It is expected that the
importance of dynamic call routing will increase in the near future. In order to perform the
initial location-based routing step to get the call setup messages to an entity closer to the
PSAP, information about the service boundaries of PSAPs need to be known to end devices,
to VSPs or to other call routing entities. This information must somehow be shared. Today,
Excel sheets are used [49] to exchange phone numbers associated with PSAP service bound-
aries. A call taker then must analyze the situation, lookup the appropriate phone number,
and manually re-route the call. This may be a reasonable initial step for the small number of
transnational emergency calls that are misrouted in today’s emergency services system but
is not a future-proof approach for a next generation IP-based emergency services system.
The inability of emergency centers to quickly re-route calls due to an overload situation in
a mass incident has already been recognized [50].
5.2. Routing Emergency Calls
In limited scenarios, where the VSP and the ISP role are offered by the same provider rout-
ing of IP-based emergency calls can be based on statically pre-configured rules. However,
the separation of these two roles to separate companies introduces challenges for emer-
gency call routing. In addition, emergency services authorities are interested to use IP and
SIP-based functionality to route calls more dynamically. To decouple the routing enforce-
ment point from the decision point an automated procedure has been standardized. Two
mechanisms are available: the service boundary exchange mechanism [51] and the Loca-
tion to Service Translation (LoST) protocol [52]. LoST may make use of LoST Sync for
distributing mappings between trusted distribution points for efficiency purposes. LoST, as
illustrated in Figure 5.2, is an HTTP-based query/response protocol where a client sends
a request containing the location information and service URN to a server and receives a
response, containing the service URL, typically a SIP URL, the service region where the
same information would be returned and an indication of how long the information is valid.
Both request and response are formatted as XML. For efficiency, responses are cached. The
response may also indicate that only a more generic emergency service is offered for this
region. For example, a request for ’urn:service:sos.marine’ in Austria may be replaced by
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Figure 5.2.: High-Level Functionality of Location-to-Service Translation (LoST).
Figure 5.3.: Main Components involved in an Emergency Call.
’urn:service:sos’. Finally, the response also indicates the emergency number / dial string for
the respective service.
5.3. Obligations
In this section we discuss the requirements the different entities need to satisfy, based on
Figure 5.3. A more detailed description can be found in [15]. Note that this narration
focuses on the final stage of deployment and does not discuss the transition architecture,
in which some implementation responsibilities can be re-arranged, with an impact on the
overall functionality offered by the emergency services architecture. A few variations were
introduced to handle the transition from the current system to a fully developed ECRIT
architecture.
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With the work on the IETF emergency architecture we have tried to balance the respon-
sibilities among the participants, as described below.
5.3.1. End Hosts
An end host, through its VoIP application, has three main responsibilities: it has to attempt
to obtain its own location, determine the URI of the appropriate PSAP for that location, and
recognize when the user places an emergency call by examining the dial string. The end
host operating system may assist in determining the device location.
The protocol interaction for location configuration is indicated as interface (a) in Fig-
ure 5.3 and several location configuration protocols have been developed to provide this
capability. Note that end hosts may also obtain location information via GPS.
A VoIP application needs to support the Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) pro-
tocol [52] in order to determine the emergency service dial strings and the PSAP URI.
Additionally, the service URNs, defined in [42], need to be understood by the device.
As currently defined, it is assumed that PSAPs can be reached by SIP, but may support
other signaling protocols, either directly or through a protocol translation gateway. A LoST
response indicates whether other signaling protocols are supported. To provide support for
multi-media communication different types of codecs may need to be supported or dynam-
ically negotiated, whereby the details can be found in [15].
5.3.2. ISP
The ISP has to make location information available to the end point via one or more of the
location configuration protocols.
In order to route an emergency call correctly to a PSAP, an ISP may initially disclose
the approximate location for routing to the end point and more precise location information
later, when emergency personnel is dispatched by the PSAP operator. The functionality
required by the IETF emergency services architecture is restricted to the disclosure of a
relatively small amount of location information, as discussed in [14].
The ISP may also operate a caching LoST server to improve the robustness and the reli-
ability of the architecture. This lowers the roundtrip time for contacting a LoST server, and
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the caches are most likely to hold the mappings of the area where the emergency caller is
currently located.
In the case where ISPs allow Internet traffic to traverse their network, the signaling and
media protocols used for emergency calls function without problems. Today, there are
no legal requirements to offer prioritization of emergency calls over IP-based networks.
While the standardization community has developed a range of Quality of Service signaling
protocols, their widespread deployment has not happened yet.
5.3.3. VSP
SIP does not mandate that call setup requests traverse SIP proxies, i.e., SIP messages can be
sent directly to the user agent. Thus, even for emergency services, it is possible to use SIP
without the involvement of a VSP. However, in terms of deployment, it is highly likely that
a VSP will be used. If a caller uses a VSP, this VSP often forces all calls, emergency and
regular calls, to traverse an outbound proxy or a session border controller (SBC) operated
by the VSP. If some end devices are unable to perform a LoST lookup, the VSP can provide
the necessary functions as a back-up solution.
If the VSP uses a signaling or media protocol that is not supported by the PSAP, it needs
to translate signaling messages and potentially also media flows.
VSPs can assist the PSAP by providing identity assurance for emergency calls, e.g., using
SIP Identity (RFC 3325 [53]), thus helping to prosecute prank callers. However, the link
between the subscriber information and the real-world person making the call is often weak.
In many cases, VSPs have, at best, only the credit card data for their customers and some of
these customers may use gift cards or other anonymous means of payment.
5.3.4. PSAP
The emergency services best current practice specification [15] only discusses the stan-
dardization of the interfaces from the VSP and ISP towards PSAPs and some parts of the
PSAP-to-PSAP call transfer mechanisms that are necessary for emergency calls to be pro-
cessed by the PSAP. Many aspects related to the internal communication within a PSAP,
between PSAPs as well as between a PSAP and first responders are beyond the scope of the
IETF specification.
When emergency calling has been fully converted to Internet protocols, PSAPs must ac-
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cept calls from any VSP, as shown in interface (d) of Figure 5.2. Since calls may come
from all sources, PSAPs must deploy mechanisms to reduce the number of malicious calls,
particularly calls containing intentionally false location information. Assuring the relia-
bility of location information remains challenging, particularly as more and more devices
are equipped with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) receivers, such as GPS, al-
lowing them to determine their own location [54]. However, it may be possible in some
cases to verify the location information provided by an end host by comparing it against
network-provided location information.
5.4. LoST Mapping Architecture
So far, we have described the LoST protocol as it is described in RFC 5222 [52], namely
as a client-server protocol. A single LoST server, however, does not store the mapping
elements for all PSAPs worldwide, for both technical and administrative reasons. Thus,
there is a need to let LoST servers interact with other LoST servers, each covering a spe-
cific geographical region. The LoST protocol already provides the baseline mechanisms for
supporting such a communication architecture, as described in RFC 5582 [55], an infor-
mational RFC providing terminology (in the form of different roles for LoST servers that
distinguish their behavior) and explaining the basic concept of the LoST mapping architec-
ture. RFC 5582 motivates the basic design decision for LoST to utilize it in a wide variety of
architectures, but leaves the detailed instantiation to deployments in different jurisdictions.
The awareness of peering LoST servers determines the structure of the architecture rather
than certain physical properties of a network, such as the topology of a fiber installation,
or the structure of a national emergency services organization. Two types of structures
are used in combination, namely a mesh and a hierarchical structure. The mesh topology
is envisioned for the top-level LoST entities, whereas the hierarchical structure reflects a
parent - child relationship in a tree. Figure 5.4 shows this structure graphically with the
LoST servers acting in their roles of forest guides (FGs) and trees. A tree consists of a
self-contained hierarchy of authoritative mapping servers (AMS) for a service. An AMS is
a LoST server that can provide the authoritative answer to a set of queries. The top-most
server in a tree is called the tree root and this server peers with one or multiple FGs, i.e., the
tree root announces its coverage region to other FGs. In Figure 5.4, for example, the root of
tree 1 interacts with FG A and makes the coverage area available. FG A also receives the
coverage area from the root of tree 2. All tree roots receive information about the coverage
area of their children in the tree. On the top level, all FGs (namely FG A, FG B, and FG C)
form a mesh and synchronize their coverage areas.
Seekers and resolvers are two additional LoST entities in the LoST mapping architecture
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Figure 5.4.: Trees and Forest Guides in the LoST Mapping Architecture.
that are not shown in Figure 5.4. Neither seekers nor resolvers provide authoritative an-
swers themselves but they may cache results. Caching of mapping elements by resolvers is
expected to be very common.
To best understand the LoST mapping architecture it is important to highlight the main
design goals:
Robustness: To ensure the stability of the system it still needs to function even if dif-
ferent deployment decisions in various parts of the world are made. It cannot be assumed
that everyone deploying LoST servers has to agree with everyone else. The minimum
level of agreement that has to be ensured is that AMSs are able to authoritatively answer
mapping queries, i.e., only those LoST servers respond authoritatively if they indeed have
the authority of a specific coverage area.
Consistent Responses: Any device (called seeker) can issue a LoST query and it will
get a consistent answer regardless of where the query enters the system. In some (rare)
cases of territorial disputes, two AMSs may claim authoritative for the same region. In
such a case, the answer received by a seeker will vary depending on the entry point into
the mapping system.
Scalability: Scalability of the LoST architecture is ensured by using caching and the
distributed nature of the LoST servers in the architecture. Any LoST entity may support
caching of received mapping elements. The mapping elements may be obtained as part of
the ordinary operation of LoST (via query and responses) but also via separate replication
of the mapping elements. LoST Sync [51] is one such protocol to exchange mappings
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between LoST servers (and other entities).
Minimal Seeker Configuration: A seeker is a LoST client requesting a mapping. The
only information a seeker needs to know is the address of a resolver; it does not need
to know the structure of all Forest Guides nor does it need to maintain a global picture
of LoST servers. To avoid having end user involvement in the configuration of LoST
servers, Section 4 of the LoST specification [52] provides a discovery technique based
on DNS, and RFC 5223 [56] offers a DHCP-based discovery procedure. Although LoST
servers can be located anywhere, a placement topologically closer to the end host, e.g.,
in the access network, may be desirable in disaster situations with intermittent network
connectivity. RFC 5223 offers this capability.
Even though it is technically possible to let seekers and resolvers enter their queries at any
point in the LoST mapping architecture, a deployment choice is to configure resolvers with
the addresses of the FGs. A query and response for an emergency caller located in Germany
with a service provider in Finland could then be shown as depicted in Figure 5.5. In our
example we assume that the VSP deploys a LoST resolver that is contacted by LoST seekers.
We furthermore assume in this example that no caching takes place to illustrate the message
flow (as shown with dotted lines). In message (1) the seeker contacts its pre-configured
resolver with a recursive query providing its current location (somewhere in Germany). The
resolver does not have any information about the PSAP that must be contacted for the given
location in Germany (for the solicited service). Since the resolver knows the address of the
FG (only one FG is shown in our example), it issues an iterative query to it, as marked with
message (2). The FG responds with the entry point for the German LoST tree. The resolver
then issues another query towards the provided tree root in message (3). In this example,
we assume that the root of tree 1 knows the address of the PSAP the seeker must contact.
This final response is then forwarded to seeker via the resolver. The resolver would want to
cache the intermediate and final results to speed-up later lookups for the same geographical
area and the same service. Once the seeker knows the final answer, it can proceed with
the emergency call setup procedure to contact the PSAP, as shown in message (4) with the
double line. (Note that the response for a different service may yield a somewhat different
service boundary.)
As illustrated, LoST servers form a distributed mapping database, with each server car-
rying mapping elements. These mapping elements are the main data structure that is com-
municated in the LoST protocol, synchronized between FGs and LoST servers in the tree,
and cached by resolvers and seekers. Figure 5.6 shows the data elements of this important
data structure graphically.
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Figure 5.5.: Example Query / Response in the LoST Mapping Architecture.
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5.5. Steps towards an IETF Emergency Services Architecture
The architecture described so far requires changes both in already-deployed VoIP end sys-
tems and in the existing PSAPs. The speed of transition and the path taken varies between
different countries depending on funding and business incentives. As such, it is difficult to
argue whether upgrading end points will be easier or replacing the emergency service infras-
tructure. In any case, the transition approaches being investigated consider both directions.
We can distinguish roughly four stages of transition:
• In the first stage VoIP end systems cannot place emergency calls at all.
• In a second stage, VoIP callers manually configure their location, and emergency calls are
routed to the appropriate PSAP as circuit-switched calls via VoIP-PSTN gateways. This
level of service is offered in some countries for PSTN-replacement VoIP services, i.e.,
VoIP services that are offered as replacement for the home phone. In the United States,
this is known as the ”NENA i2” transition architecture.
• In a third stage, PSAPs maintain two separate infrastructures, one for calls arriving via an
IP network, and another one for calls originating in the legacy infrastructure.
• In the final stage, all calls, including those from traditional cell phones and analog landline
phones, reach the PSAP via IP networks, with the legacy calls converted to IP-based calls,
based on the requirements outlined in [57], either by the carriers or by gateways at the
edge of the emergency service infrastructure.
5.5.1. Legacy End Points
Figure 5.6 shows an emergency services architecture with legacy end points. When the
emergency caller dials the European-wide emergency number ’112’ (step 0), the device
treats it as any other call without recognizing it as an emergency call, i.e., the dial string
provided by the end point that may conform to RFC 4967 [58] or RFC 3966 [59] is signaled
to the VSP (step 1). Recognition of the dial string is then left to the VSP for processing/sort-
ing; the same is true for location retrieval (step 2) and routing to the nearest (or appropriate)
PSAP (step 3). Dial string recognition, location determination and call routing are simpler
on a fixed device and voice / application service provided only by the ISP than when they
are provided via separate a VSP and ISP.
If devices are used in environments without location services, the VSP’s SIP proxy may
need to insert location information based on estimates or subscriber data. We briefly de-
scribe these cases below.
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Figure 5.7.: Emergency Services Architecture with Legacy End Points.
There are two main challenges to overcome when dealing with legacy devices: First, the
VSP has to discover the LIS that knows the location of the IP-based end host. The VSP
is only likely to know the IP address of that device, which is visible in the call signaling
message that arrives at the VSP. When a LIS is discovered and contacted, and some amount
of location information is available, then the second challenge arises, namely how to route
the emergency call to the appropriate PSAP. To accomplish the latter task, it is necessary to
have some information about the PSAP boundaries.
[15] does not describe a complete solution for interworking with legacy PSAPs but in-
stead offers building blocks to use. The following constraints exist when dealing with legacy
end points:
• Only the emergency numbers configured at the VSP are understood. This may lead to
cases where a dialed emergency number is not recognized or a non-emergency call is
routed to a PSAP.
• Using the host’s IP address to discover the ISP network to which the host is attached is
challenging and may, in case of mobility protocols and VPNs, lead to wrong results.
• Security and privacy concerns may arise when many VSPs/ASPs can retrieve location
information from an ISP. It is likely that only authorized VSP/ASPs will be granted access
to location information for privacy, security and business reasons. Hence, it is unlikely
that such a solution would work smoothly across national boundaries.
• When the emergency call is not recognized by the User Agent then functions like call
waiting, call transfer, three-way call, flash hold, outbound call blocking, etc. cannot be
disabled. This may lead to unexpected user experience.
• The User Agent software may block callbacks from the PSAP since it does not have ways
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to recognize incoming calls related to the earlier emergency.
• Privacy settings may not be respected, and identity information may get disclosed to
unauthorized parties. These privacy features exist in some jurisdiction are even available
for emergency calls.
• Certain VoIP call features may not be supported, such as a REFER (for conference call
and transfer to secondary PSAP) or the Globally Routable User Agent URIs (GRUU) for
identifying individual devices issuing the emergency call.
• User Agents will not be able to convey location information to the VSP (even if it is
available).
As discussed in Chapter 3 a LIS discovery mechanism has been standardized with RFC
7216 [23] and HELD was extended in RFC 7840 [27] to also return emergency services
call routing information. While this helps to tackle the main challenges it still leaves the
international deployment questionable due to security and privacy concerns.
5.5.2. Partially Upgraded End Hosts
A giant step forward in simplifying the handling of IP-based emergency calls is to provide
the end host with some information for LIS discovery. The end host may, for example, learn
the ISP’s domain name, by using LIS discovery [60], or might even obtain a Location by
Reference (LbyR) via HELD [24]. The VSP is then either able to resolve the LbyR in order
to route the call or to use the domain to discover a LIS using DNS. It is even possible to
associate policy information to the URI resolution procedure based on the extension defined
in RFC 7199 [61]. The use of LbyRs together with this policy extension provides additional
privacy features since location information is only disclosed to those parties in possession of
the location reference and the end devices, as the target, can control the resolution process
using policies.
Additional software upgrades at the end device may allow emergency calls to be rec-
ognized based on some pre-configured emergency numbers (e.g., ’1-1-2’ and ’9-1-1’) and
allow for the implementation of other emergency service-related features, such as disabling
silence suppression during emergency calls.
5.5.3. Emergency Services for Persons with Disabilities
The capabilities of modern IP-based communication protocols, such as SIP, easily enable
multi-media communication. Video, real-time text, and instant messaging give persons with
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disabilities access to emergency services. Unfortunately, support for multi-media commu-
nication by emergency authorities is still poor, if available at all. Fax has been used in
several countries in Europe, and Teletypewriter (TTY) in the US. In the meanwhile, more
and more countries are offering SMS-based access to emergency services for persons with
disabilities. The European REACH-112 pilot project [62] showed that the standardized IP-
based emergency services technology is available and working. Proper integration of the
text messaging system into the PSAP software environment is, however, often not available
and additional training of call takers is necessary to ensure proper response times. From
the REACH-112 pilot and from various SMS-based emergency services deployments, it is
known that few persons make use of the new capabilities. This circumstance may have
many reasons, such as a lack of awareness of the availability of such a service, unfamiliarity
with multi-media emergency calls, and the smaller user base that needs such capabilities
(compared to those who feel comfortable just making voice-based emergency calls).
The ability to use multi-media communication has significantly increased over the last
10 years with the increasing capabilities of smart phones. Transmitting instant messages,
real-time text, pictures, and video is a common feature of applications running on smart
phones and Internet tablets. Since the deployment of IP-based phones is increasing dramat-
ically, we expect that more users, not only those with disabilities, will find the multi-media
functionality attractive.
The use of IP-based protocols does not only offer additional functionality but also adds
properties like protocol feature and media type negotiation. This allows two communication
end points to agree on the latest and best possible communication mechanisms. This is
clearly important for extensibility and incremental deployment. If, for example, a device
supports a better and newer audio codec then this may lead to better audio quality with
a lower bandwidth overhead. In addition to the support provided by SIP, LoST allows
emergency services authorities to publish information about the protocols through which
they are reachable via information encoded in the URIs returned by the LoST protocol.
5.5.4. Vehicle Initiated Emergency Calls
A quick response by emergency services is essential to save lives in a car accident. When an
emergency call is automatically triggered, and location information is provided along with
the emergency call then the number of road deaths and injuries can be reduced.
In the late 1990s the European Commission started an initiative to require car manufactur-
ers to install a so-called in-vehicle system (IVS), which enables vehicle initiated emergency
calls. This system became known as eCall. The IVS is able to initiate an emergency call,
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supports GPS-based location information and can obtain sensor data from the vehicle.
A circuit switched eCall system was standardized, which uses a regular voice call and an
inband modem to communicate vehicle information, crash related sensor data, and location
information (the Minimum Set of Data or MSD) within the voice channel.
Deploying this circuit switched eCall system took a very long time, mostly due to political
reasons. With the transition to IP-based networks it was an obvious step to also standardize
the next generation (NG) eCall system. NG-eCall moves from circuit switched to all-IP and
carries the vehicle data and crash information as additional data along with SIP signaling.
RFC 8147 [63] standardizes the NG-eCall functionality by re-using the already specified
IP-based emergency services functionality. RFC 8147 defines the necessary MIME media
types for the MSD and a procedure for requesting and responding to further data requests
from the PSAP.
A new new Service URNs is defined in RFC 8147 to allow the routing of eCalls, both
manually initiated as well as automatically triggered, to the correct PSAP. A test Service
URN is also defined to allow the eCall system to be tested without negatively impacting any
ongoing emergency calls.
A separate specification, RFC 8148 [9], specifies emergency calls placed by vehicles for
use in regions other than Europe, which make use of a different set of vehicle (crash) data,
namely the Vehicle Emergency Data Set (VEDS) rather than the eCall Minimum Set of
Data (MSD). In addition to the different data communicated to the PSAP three different
deployment models are supported:
• In the ”direct model” the IVS communicates the emergency call and the crash data directly
to the PSAP.
• In the ”paired model” the IVS interacts with a handset, which then communicates the
emergency call and the crash data to the PSAP.
• Finally, in the ”TSP model” the IVS interacts with a third party, the Telematics Service
Provider (TSP), which then routes the emergency call and the crash data to the PSAP.
5.5.5. Additional Data
Call takers, first responders, and the emergency services community in general prefer to
have better situational awareness about an emergency related incident. More information
alone is, however, not sufficient it also needs to be of better quality. The importance of accu-
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rate location information has already been highlighted and with emergency calls triggered
by vehicles additional information is available about the crash and the vehicle itself.
There are, however, various other sources of information. The originating device, the
access network provider to which the device is connected, and all service providers in the
path of the call have information about the call, the caller, or the location, which is helpful
for the PSAP to have in handling the emergency.
RFC 7852 [64] defines data structures and mechanisms to convey such data to the PSAP
either per-value or by reference. Conveying information by reference allows extra access
control policies to be applied before releasing information. This can help to ensure better
privacy protection since this additional data about the call, caller, and the location is data
directly or indirectly related to a person.
5.5.6. Data-Only Emergency Calls
RFC 6443 [57] describes how IP-based emergency calls are initiated from devices using
SIP and how they are processed by PSAPs. The focus is thereby on multimedia calls, which
almost always includes voice but may include real-time text, video and instant messaging.
The ability to include additional data alongside the call has been highlighted previously
already.
In some cases devices do not need to establish a communication session to transmit voice,
video and other multimedia. [10] focuses on the cases where the transmission of applica-
tion data is all that is needed. To communicate sensor information the Common Alerting
Protocol (CAP) is used inside a SIP MESSAGE. For communication security DTLS / TLS
is re-used. CAP is known for authority-to-citizen early warning but can also be used in the
reverse communication direction, namely from devices to the PSAP. CAP is an XML-based
document format with pre-defined information elements to communicate meta-data about
the alert and the sensor readings itself. For location information and other data the existing
payloads can be used in the SIP message offering seamless integration of sensors and other
Internet of Things devices into the emergency services infrastructure.
The data-only emergency call concept marked a transition from the classical voice (where
the human was in the center of the communication) to a model where data is communicated
automatically by machines. While this work is still at an early stage it represents a promis-
ing direction for future research where automatic processing of many events combined with
machine learning may allow to detect dangerous situations quicker. Chapter 7 explores
options for securing data communication of IoT devices using standardized security tech-
nologies.

Chapter6
Securing IP-based Emergency Services
Networks
6.1. Introduction
IP networks and the SIP-based communication infrastructure creates the foundation on top
of which emergency services support is added via a number of building blocks. The build-
ing blocks provide the basis for (a) determining location information, (b) recognizing an
emergency call, (c) evaluating the route towards the PSAP, (d) establishing the SIP session
setup and (e) exchanging multi-media data traffic (such as voice, video, text messages, and
real-time text). As explained in Chapter 5 there are architectural variants that impact which
of these building blocks are used and how. While there are unique aspects to each of these
architectural variants, many of the security aspects are still common across all IP-based
emergency services deployments.
When considering the security properties of the overall emergency services system, two
observations can be made:
1. Emergency services support builds on top of the regular communication infrastructure,
and therefore the security properties of the underlying infrastructure are inherited.
2. Security has to be taken into consideration for each and every protocol since the result-
ing system is as secure as the weakest link. This also implies that the security analysis
available for each protocol has to be taken into account by the respective users of those
protocols.
Developing protocol specifications by incorporating security during the design is only
the first step in developing secure Internet-scale systems. Implementations of these pro-
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tocols also need to be secure against various attacks, such as buffer overflows, and the
deployed system must be configured in the appropriate way (e.g., to withstand denial of ser-
vice attacks or to be secured against unauthorized access). Building secure communication
systems that include emergency services components is complex and presumes education
and awareness (e.g., via employee training), good software management practices (e.g.,
secure coding, extensive testing, software update processes), established and working pro-
cesses (e.g., incident management, clearly defined responsibilities and accountability), etc.
A detailed discussion of the secure software development lifecycle is, however, outside the
scope of this thesis. Instead, the focus of this work is mainly on the initial phase of the
lifecycle, namely on the protocol design. Building communication systems based on stan-
dards provides better guarantees that specifications have been extensively reviewed thereby
improving the quality of the work.
To focus on the security characteristics that are unique to emergency services I first de-
scribe the communication model, the involved entities, and then investigate the adversary
model and the security threats. Finally, a list of countermeasures is provided.
6.2. Communication Model
The high-level communication models are shown in Figure 6.110.
As shown in Figure 6.1, there are four main communication interactions to consider:
I. SIP Signaling Communication: The SIP signaling exchange is at the heart of the
IP-based emergency services communication and travels between the endpoints, the end
host and the PSAP. SIP [66] is an application-layer control (signaling) protocol for cre-
ating, modifying, and terminating sessions with one or more participants. Emergency
services functionality has been added to SIP with specifications that define the ability to
express emergency services functionality (by using the service URN specification in RFC
5031 [42]) and the ability to carry location objects (see [67]). SIP uses proxies as inter-
mediaries to route the call. Due to the added emergency services functionality SIP roxies
10This chapter uses the terms ’Location Server’ (LS) as well as ’Location Information Server’ (LIS). RFC
6280 [65] describes the LIS as follows: ”Some entities performing the Location Generator (LG) role are de-
signed only to provide Targets with their own locations, as opposed to distributing a Target’s location to others.
The process of providing a Target with its own location is known within Geopriv as Location Configuration.
The term ’Location Information Server’ (LIS) is often used to describe the entity that performs this function.
However, a LIS may also perform other functions, such as providing a Target’s location to other entities.” RFC
6280 defines the Location Server as follows: “Location Server: The Location Server is responsible for enforcing
the Target’s Privacy Rules.”
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Figure 6.1.: Communication Model Overview.
are also called Emergency Services Routing Proxies (ESRPs). The PSAP itself is located
inisde the Emergency Services IP Network (ESINet). Chapter 5 describes the emergency
services architecture as standardized by the IETF in more detail. After the emergency ser-
vices communication is terminated, it is possible for the PSAP to initiate a callback to the
emergency call, for example, when details about the situation need to be clarified or the
caller prematurely terminates the conversation. The call setup procedure then starts with
the PSAP and the SIP session setup messages travel towards the end device that initiated
the call.
II. Exchange of Multi-Media Data: The main purpose of the communication setup
is to exchange data. For emergency calls this typically takes the form of voice packets. In
the future, this will also be video, instant messages, real-time text, and pictures, supported
by the capabilities of IP. SIP can detect and negotiate the supported functionality and to
enable the exchange of these additional media streams. The used media will largely
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depend on the capabilities of the devices, the installed software applications, and the
preferences of the emergency caller. For persons with disabilities, real-time text and
video communication is likely to make a big difference, but might require a third party
relay service to be invoked, for example, for sign language interpretation.
III. Mapping Database: When emergency call setup is initiated, the call routing pro-
cesses must decide the next hop to route the setup messages to. A major factor in call
routing is location information since the geographically closest PSAP will often want to
receive the call first. In some cases, other factors, such as the load situation at a PSAP or
the ability to accept certain media types, also influence the decision. For location-based
routing, the distributed mapping database that uses the protocol LoST is used, as illus-
trated in [55] and described in Chapter 5. The design allows end hosts and ESRPs to ask
for the appropriate PSAP based on a given location input.
IV. Location Infrastructure: The location retrieval interaction starts with an entity is-
suing a request for a location object. The requesting party is the Location Recipient,
which may be the end host, an ESRP, or the PSAP. Each of these entities have a legit-
imate interest in receiving location information for the determination of the appropriate
emergency dial strings, for emergency call routing, or for the dispatch of first responders.
When a location server, which is commonly assumed to be operated by an ISP, receives
a location request, it may not always have the current information cached. The location
server then starts a location determination process whereby location generators collect
positioning data. The location server may provide location information not only as a one-
shot transaction, or may provide multiple updates as location determination techniques
compute better location over time or when the location of the target device changes. For
security and privacy purposes, location may not be shared without a prior authorization
check, which is invoked based on a rule set available to the location server. RFC 6280 [65]
illustrates a location architecture and introduces terminology.
6.3. Adversary Models
In a discussion about security, it is important to keep the anticipated capabilities of an ad-
versary in mind. We distinguish between three types of adversaries:
External Adversary Model: This type of adversary is the most commonly considered
adversary in communication networks. The adversary is external to the analyzed sys-
tem and interferes from the outside. In such a threat model, it is assumed that none of
the emergency service infrastructure elements has been compromised. Consider the case
where a person makes an emergency call. An adversary could be located along the com-
munication path between the end host and the location server, between the end host and
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the PSAP, or between any other emergency services components. Without proper com-
munication security, this type of adversary could eavesdrop on the communication, inject
new messages, or prevent the emergency caller from successfully calling for help.
Malicious Infrastructure Adversary Model: With this type of adversary, we assume
that some entities in the emergency services infrastructure are either mis-configured or
compromised and can thereby disrupt the normal emergency system operation. Such
misconfigured or compromised elements can include the LIS, the Location-to-Service
Translation (LoST) infrastructure [52, 55], and call routing elements, which may be ma-
nipulated to respond with false information.
Malicious End Host Adversary Model: With this adversary model we assume that the
end system is compromised. Although this type of adversary model, is a sub-category
of the malicious infrastructure adversary model it deserves special attention since end
systems, like tablets and desktop PCs, are often more vulnerable due to their poor software
update policy and lack of proper administration. Furthermore, a human interacting with
the emergency services authorities may have intentions that are not aligned with the call
takers or the first responders. We will discuss these problems in context of hoax calls.
In the description of each security threat, the assumptions that need to be met for a suc-
cessful attack will be described next.
6.4. Security Threats
As a starting point we have to think about the motivations of an attacker and to speculate
about their available resources to launch such an attack. While some attacks will ”carry
over” from the existing telephony system, others will be new due to the additional capabili-
ties offered by IP-based emergency services systems.
Attackers may direct their efforts either against a portion of the emergency response
system or against an individual. Attacks against the emergency response system have three
possible objectives:
• to deny system services to all users in a given area. The motivation may range from
thoughtless vandalism, to wide-scale criminality, to terrorism.
• to convey prank calls to PSAP call takers and first responders. A fairly small number of
prank calls may consume an enormous amount of resources from the emergency services
infrastructure. While there are many variations of these prank and hoax calls a severe
version is called ”swatting” where an adversary simulates the commission of a punishable
offense (such as a hijacking situation) and at the same time fools the emergency services
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system in using wrong location information for dispatching police units. Most of the
reported incidents of swatting took place in the US and in Canada [68]. Hoax calls do,
however, happen also in other parts of the world, for example in Europe [69].
One can certainly imagine other, more exotic types of attacks. For example, an attacker
could
• divert emergency calls to non-emergency sites. This is a form of a denial-of-service attack
that can be very confusing for the emergency caller since he or she expects to talk to a
PSAP operator but instead gets connected to someone else.
• gain unauthorized access to paid services by using an emergency identifier to bypass reg-
ular authentication, authorization, and accounting procedures. The goal of the adversary
with such an attack is to gain a financial advantage.
• get elevated priority treatment in the hope to get faster service access.
Attacks against an individual may have the following motivation:
• to prevent an individual from receiving aid.
• to gain information about an emergency that can be applied either against an individual
involved in that emergency or to the profit of the attacker.
• to deliver unwanted messages to a non-emergency caller using technologies developed
for emergency services purposes. For example, the PSAP callback mechanism [7], if
deployed incorrectly, could be used to bypass authorization policies.
• to use technology designed for emergency services to turn a user’s phone into a recording
device.
• to use sensitive personal data (e.g., health records) for non-emergency services purposes,
or to retain personal data beyond an acceptable retention period.
• to disclose information about the call, caller, and the emergency situation to third parties
without prior consent of the emergency caller.
In the subsections below we describe a few attacks in more detail. The list is not exhaus-
tive but illustrates concerns frequently raised.
6.4.1. Denial of Service Attacks
Emergency services have at least three finite resources subject to denial of service attacks:
the network and server infrastructure, call takers, and first responders, such as fire fighters
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and police officers. The task of protecting network and server infrastructure shares similari-
ties with high-value e-commerce sites, and lessons can be learned from these environments
particularly regarding capacity planning, load balancing, DDoS prevention techniques, and
abuse reporting. Call takers are a far more limited resource; even large cities only have
PSAPs with only a handful of PSAP call takers on duty. Even if the call takers attempt to
question the caller to weed out prank calls, they would be quickly overwhelmed by even
a small-scale attack. Finally, first responder resources are limited as well; and since every
assignment takes an extended period of time, their resources are quickly dried up.
6.4.2. Attacks Involving the Emergency Identifier
The overall process of establishing an emergency call begins with the person in need for help
dialing the emergency dial string. The exact sequence of digits depends on the infrastructure
the device is connected to. Although 1-1-2 became the emergency services number for
Europe, and 9-1-1 for the US, many countries still provide emergency numbers in addition
to the 112/911. Furthermore, many large enterprises, universities, and hotels prefix the
emergency numbers with additional digits, such as 0-112. Therefore, it is important for
devices that can be used in different environments to automatically detect which dial string
triggers an emergency call. Pre-programming the list of numbers in use world-wide is not
possible due to the overlap of emergency and non-emergency numbers. Attempts to agree
on a smaller set of emergency numbers has not been very successful so far.
With dial strings there are two challenges to solve:
1. A device needs the ability to learn the emergency services numbers available for a specific
attachment point. LoST provides a mechanism for obtaining the emergency dial string
for a given location. 3GPP radio networks also allow a device to be provisioned with
emergency numbers.
2. For unambiguous processing of protocol messages throughout the emergency call chain,
it is useful to replace the user entered dial string with a symbolic name. This is accom-
plished with the service URNs, see RFC 5031 [42]. Calls marked with this emergency
identifier are then treated as emergency calls by the call routing entities. An example of a
service URN is ”urn:service:sos.police”. In combination with LoST’s ability to learn the
dial string for a given location, this allows a device to dynamically translate emergency
dial strings to service URNs for usage in emergency calls.
However, users do not ”dial” an emergency URN themselves. Instead, the entered emer-
gency dial strings are translated to corresponding service URNs and then these service
URNs are carried in SIP signaling messages (e.g., the Request-URI of a INVITE request).
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This translation should ideally be done at the end point so that the semantic of the emergency
call is preserved throughout the entire end-to-end signaling chain. This allows location in-
formation information to be added by the end host or by intermediaries along the signaling
path and to enable or disable emergency services relevant call features (e.g., noise cancella-
tion). Also, once a call is marked with a service URN call routing entities give it preferential
treatment.
The main possibility for an attack involves use of the emergency identifier to bypass the
normal procedures in order to achieve fraudulent use of services. An attack of this sort is
possible only if the following conditions are true:
• The attacker is faking an emergency call.
• The call enters the domain of a service provider, which accepts it without applying normal
procedures for authentication and authorization because the signaling carries the emer-
gency identifier.
• The service provider routes the call according to the called address (e.g., SIP Request-
URI), without verifying that this is the address of a PSAP (noting that a URI by itself
does not indicate the nature of the entity it is pointing to).
If these conditions are satisfied, the attacker can bypass normal service provider au-
thorization procedures for arbitrary destinations, simply by reprogramming the emergency
caller’s device to add the emergency identifier to non-emergency call signaling. If resource
priority headers [70] are used, a call routing device may also be tricked into using this infor-
mation as the sole basis for bypassing authentication, or authorization procedures if it uses
these headers as the sole basis for its decision. This would also allow an adversary to use
this indication to gain preferential treatment of marked traffic over other network traffic.
6.4.3. Attacks Against the Mapping System
This section considers attacks intended to reduce the effectiveness of the emergency re-
sponse system for all callers in a given area. If the mapping operation is disabled, then the
correct functioning of the emergency call routing infrastructure cannot be guaranteed. Con-
sequently, the probability that emergency calls will be routed to the wrong PSAP increases.
Routing calls to the wrong PSAP may have two consequences: emergency response to the
affected calls is delayed, and PSAP call taker resources outside the immediate area of the
emergency are consumed due to the extra effort required to redirect the calls. Alternatively,
attacks that cause the client to receive a URI that does not lead to a PSAP have the immedi-
ate effect of causing emergency calls to fail.
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Three basic attacks on the mapping process can be identified: denial of service, imper-
sonation of the mapping server, or corruption of the mapping database. Denial of service
can be achieved in several ways:
• by a flooding attack on the mapping server;
• by taking control of the mapping server and either preventing it from responding or caus-
ing it to send incorrect responses;
• by taking control of any intermediary node (for example, a router) through which the
mapping queries and responses pass, and then using that control to block them. An adver-
sary may also attempt to modify the mapping protocol signaling messages. Additionally,
the adversary may be able to replay past communication exchanges to fool an emergency
caller by returning incorrect results.
In an impersonation attack, the attacker induces the mapping client to direct its queries
to a host under the attacker’s control rather than the real mapping server, or the attacker
suppresses the response from the real mapping server and sends a spoofed response.
The former type of impersonation attack itself is an issue of mapping server discovery
rather than the mapping protocol directly. However, the mapping protocol may allow imper-
sonation to be detected, thereby preventing acceptance of responses from an impersonating
entity and possibly triggering a more secure discovery procedure.
The details of the attack surface may, however, vary between the different designs. More
details about LoST are provided in the subsequent paragraph to illustrate some of the design
decisions.
For those cases where an end host obtains the LoST server URI via DHCP, as described
in RFC 5223 [56], it has to rely on the security of the local network and the mechanism to
protect network access since there is no usable DHCP security mechanism available today.
While there is a sufficiently solid security infrastructure in most enterprise networks the
situation is very different in hotspots and home networks where either no network access
authentication is provided or configuration is managed by ordinary end users.
In other deployments the DNS infrastructure will be used to discovery a LoST server. It is
worthwhile to highlight a design decision that was made for the discovery procedure, which
uses the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS) described in RFC 3958 [71]. Con-
trary to the advice given in RFC 3958 where the input to the discovery procedure is the
reference identifier, the discovery procedure specified in Section 4 of RFC 5222 uses the
output of the discovery procedure as the reference identifier. The reference identifier is de-
fined in RFC 6125 [72] to describe an algorithm for verifying the service identity. This
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approach introduces additional security risks because the attack surface is extended to the
DNS infrastructure. The attacks include, for example, interception of DNS packets between
the client and the recursive name server, DNS cache poisoning, and intentional modifica-
tions by the recursive name server; see RFC 3833 [73] for more comprehensive discussion.
This design decision was made to make LoST deployment practical because many appli-
cation service providers will not operate their own LoST servers but will instead delegate
operation to an existing LoST server infrastructure. As such, there will be a large number
of application service providers using a relatively small number of LoST servers. A given
LoST server may not even be aware of all the application service domains pointing to it.
Another concern with the use of a distributed mapping database is the ability to attack
the mapping database itself. Injecting fake mapping entities into this distributed mapping
database may lead to an inconsistent state, and could also lead to denial of service attacks.
If the mapping data entry contains a URL to a server that does not exist then emergency
services for the indicated area are not reachable. If the URL for many (or all) mapping data
entries point to a single PSAP (rather than to the original envisioned, possibly larger number
of PSAPs) then this PSAP is likely to experience overload conditions. If the mapping data
contains a URL that points to a server controlled by the adversary itself, impersonation is
possible.
6.4.4. Attacks against the Location Information Server
A LIS provides location information to end hosts and other entities in the system, which is
then used for routing of emergency calls and for dispatching first responders. The LIS itself
often has to obtain information from other sources to determine the location of an end host.
The complexity of this process varies with the size of the network topology, with the used
network infrastructure (e.g., fixed vs. mobile technology), the mix of different technologies
(e.g., WLAN and cellular radio technologies), the features supported by end devices to
cooperate in the location determination procedure. More details about this process can be
found in RFC 6280 [65].
An adversary who wants to provide false location to a PSAP has a number of choices.
Tampering with location information is one possibility and interfering with the location
determination procedure executed by a LIS is another possible approach.
The process of determining location information heavily depends on the specific network
deployment, but at an abstract level, the process is simple: A Location Recipient, like the
end host or an ESRP, transmits a request for location information to a LIS. Some information
about the device to be located has to be conveyed in the request to allow the LIS to perform
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the location lookup. Unfortunately, there is no unique device identifier available. Location
Recipients have a few identifiers to choose from; the IP address is commonly used. Other
identifiers are, as defined in [25], MAC address, Network Access Identifier, and a DHCP
Unique Identifier. When a LIS receives such a request for location information, it associates
the obtained identifier with information available in its databases. The data may have been
manually provisioned, but will typically be collected automatically from normal network
operation, such as network management, network attachment procedures, mobility proto-
cols, and security protocols. For example, a LIS located in a DSL network receives a request
asking for location related to a specific IP address. The IP address may be allocated from a
pool of addresses maintained by the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
server and therefore the AAA server has to be queried. The AAA server is used during
the network access authentication procedure to authenticate the end host and the user and
authorizes the use of certain resources on the network. Examples of AAA technologies are
RADIUS [74] and Diameter [75]. The AAA server may know the current attachment point
of the end host or may use available information about the DSL Access Module (DSLAM)
and Access Node (AN) and the related identifiers (e.g., Ethernet VLAN tags, Layer 2 tunnel
identifiers, virtual port ID (VPI) and virtual circuit ID (VCI)) to determine the position of
the end host. Further examples of such measurement identifiers are provided in [76].
Consequently, there are various methods by which an adversary can interfere with the
process of resolving a chain of identifiers to obtain location information. If the adversary
succeeds in feeding incorrect information in the lookup step, it may be able to fool a LIS into
providing out wrong location information. Examples of interfering with identifier mapping
include the sending of a false MAC address or an IP address to obtain different location
information. It should also be noted that wiremap maintenance is prone to errors thereby
resulting in wrong information being provided out even in the absence of malice.
Caller ID spoofing in today’s network is a common way to trick the location lookup
procedure into producing the wrong result. Details are described in [77].
6.4.5. Swatting
Prank calls have been a problem for emergency services, dating back to the time of street
corner call boxes. Individual prank calls waste scarce emergency service resources and
possibly endanger bystanders or emergency service personnel as they rush to the reported
scene of a fire or accident. Risks to human life are not a typical security threat within
communication protocols. Emergency services are, however, different in this regard. 9-1-1
’swatting’ incidents with life threatening consequences have captured media attention [78].
Some of these incidents have involved spoofing of the originating phone number when
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calling 9-1-1, leading to a false location being obtained via the phone number-to-location
lookup used in fixed line environments. This could result in a SWAT team being dispatched
to the location of a completely innocent citizen if the swatter is able to convince the call taker
that a serious crime is under way. The FBI has warned about the increasing prevalence of
swatting incidents [79].
To reduce prank calls the legacy emergency service infrastructure relies on the ability to
identify callers and on the difficulty of location spoofing for ordinary users. To ascertain
the caller’s identity is important since the threat of severe punishments reduces prank calls.
Mechanically placing a large number of emergency calls that appear to come from differ-
ent locations has believed to be difficult but has gotten increasingly easier with the use of
VoIP, the ability to get illegal access to the backend telecommunication infrastructure, new
business models (such as bulk unsolicited commercial messaging), certain features of the
telecommunication infrastructure (such as the lack of cryptographic validation of accurate
caller origination), and the increasing number of VoIP providers that make difficult to trust
everyone of them. Calls from pay phones are subject to greater scrutiny by the call taker.
In the PSTN, it was more difficult for an attacker from one country to attack the emergency
services infrastructure located in another country.
In countries that do not allow SIM-less legacy emergency calls the identity of most callers
can be ascertained, so that the threat of severe punishments reduces prank calls. The term
SIM-less emergency calls refers to the use of mobile phones without a SIM card where
no authentication takes place at the network and at the application layer. The term was
introduced when mobile phones did not run third party VoIP applications that could also be
used to make emergency calls. As a comparison, in countries where SIM-less emergency
calls are allowed prank calls may be as high as 50% [69].
There is a fear that VoIP systems further simplify these types of prank calls when identi-
ties and location information can easily be crafted. It may even be possible to have attackers
located in one country to attack the emergency services infrastructure located in a different
country or to mechanically (with the help of bot nets) initiate a large number of emergency
calls that appear to come from different locations.
6.4.6. Attacks to Prevent a Specific Individual from Receiving Aid
If an attacker wishes to deny emergency service to a specific individual, the mass attacks
described earlier will also work provided that the target individual is within the affected
population. The collateral damage would, however, be huge. Except for the flooding attack
on the mapping infrastructure, the attacker may also want to focus on a specific individual.
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To guarantee effectiveness an adversary may attack the end device directly rather than the
emergency services infrastructure.
The choices available to the attacker are
• to take control of any intermediary node (for example, a WLAN router at the user’s home).
Absent further security mechanisms this allows the adversary to modify requests and
responses or to even block the entire communication. Improper configuration or lack
of software updates leaves many home routers vulnerable to attacks, as these incidents
demonstrate [80, 81].
• to interfere with the communication of the end device and other emergency service enti-
ties, for example, over the WLAN home network.
• to infect the user’s device with malware and consequently to have full control over the
device.
In general, these type of attacks are difficult (or impossible) to prevent by an emergency
services system itself since they rely on the overall security of the Internet eco-system in
general.
6.4.7. Attacks to Gain Information about an Emergency
This section discusses attacks used to gain information about an emergency. The attacker
may be seeking the location of the caller (e.g., to effect a criminal attack) or to use in-
formation to link an individual (the caller or someone else involved in the emergency) with
embarrassing information related to the emergency (e.g., ”Who did the police take away just
now?”). Finally, the attacker could take profit from the emergency, perhaps by offering his
or her services (e.g., a news reporter, or a lawyer aggressively seeking new business). The
primary information that interceptions of mapping requests and responses will reveal are a
location, a URI identifying a PSAP, the emergency service identifier, and the addresses of
the mapping client and server. The location information can be directly useful to an attacker
if the attacker has high assurance that the observed query is related to an emergency involv-
ing the target. The type of emergency (fire, police, or ambulance) might also be revealed by
the emergency service identifier in the mapping query. The other pieces of information may
provide the basis for further attacks on emergency call routing. The attacker may gain in-
formation that allows for interference with the call after it has been set up or for interception
of the media stream between the caller and the PSAP.
Finally, the attacker may gain access to the conversation between the emergency caller
and the call taker rather than just the meta-data about the incident. This is particularly easy
Securing IP-based Emergency Services Networks 64
if the media communication is not confidentiality protected.
6.4.8. Interfering with the LIS and LoST Server Discovery Procedure
Many entities in the emergency services architecture are configurable to offer some amount
of flexibility. Dynamic discovery procedures have been developed to avoid manual config-
uration. The LIS and the LoST server discovery are examples.
The primary attack against the discovery step is impersonation. When there is no natural
a-priori relationship between the two devices, then the attack surface is increased. End
devices, for example, are not supposed to be pre-configured manually with a LIS located
in their ISPs network. Particularly, for mobile devices that frequently change their point
of attachment the LIS needs to be dynamically discovered. In case of LoST, however, an
end device may be statically provisioned to use a single LoST server all the time. Similarly
to the DNS, however, it is possible to discover and use a local LoST sever, which would
provide improved resilience and shorter round-trip times.
An attacker could attempt to compromise LIS and LoST discovery at any of three stages:
1. providing a falsified domain name to be used as input to U-NAPTR (for example when
this information is provided via DHCP to the end devices [56, 60]),
2. altering the DNS records used in the U-NAPTR resolution [52, 82],
3. impersonating the LIS or LoST server itself.
The U-NAPTR resolution process is entirely dependent on its inputs. In falsifying a
domain name, an attacker avoids any later protections, bypassing them entirely. To ensure
the reliability of the access network domain name DHCP option, it is necessary to prevent
DHCP messages from being modified or spoofed by attackers.
Once a client has been tricked into talking with the wrong LIS or LoST server, subsequent
steps for emergency service protocol execution may fail or are manipulated in favor of the
adversary.
6.4.9. Call Identity Spoofing
If an adversary can place emergency calls without disclosing its identity, then determining
the source of prank calls is more difficult. Neither the PSAP call takers nor the emergency
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services authorities authenticate emergency callers themselves directly. There are at least
two separate layers of authentication and authorization:
• Authentication at the link layer or at the network layer (e.g., using the Extensible Authen-
tication Protocol (EAP) [83])
• Authentication at the application layer, for example at the VoIP application.
Note that this split is the result of the separation between the ISP and the VSP. Since two
different stakeholders manage the identifier space, the identities used during authentication
are different as well. While not all architectures assume such a separation of roles, they are
nevertheless common on the Internet today.
Even with proper authentication at the VSP or the ISP, there is the question of how strong
the prior identity proofing step was, that is, what identity information did the customer
provide in order to create an account with an ISP or VSP to use their communication servers.
The quality of identity proofing must not be ignored since it links the digital identity to the
identity of a person in the real world. This aspect is described in more detail in NIST Special
Publication 800-63 [84].
In case of misuse, the emergency services authorities must contact the VSP and/or the
ISP to identify a particular individual. In certain cases, there is no authentication procedure
executed and hence this re-identification can be challenging. This might, for example, be
the case with an open IEEE 802.11 WLAN hotspot. While the owner of the WLAN hotspot
can be determined, this may be insufficient for determining the adversary misusing the open
WiFi network.
Given the importance of authentication for ensuring accountability in case of misuse, mis-
takes made in the legacy telephony network can be fixed. The ability to make emergency
calls without any form of authentication or by utilizing caller-id spoofing can be prevented
by various technical means, education about the negative side-effects, and by regulatory
mandates. Mandating authentication for emergency calls, and even the introduction of spe-
cial credentials, for example an emergency certificate, is imaginable. Dedicated security
mechanisms increase costs, introduce an administrative overhead and are only, from a secu-
rity point of view, useful when widely used.
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6.5. Countermeasures
In the previous section we illustrated a few attacks on the emergency services system. In
this section, we highlight a number of techniques to mitigate these threats.
6.5.1. Discovery
Link layer security is commonly used for securing the initial communication link between
an end device and the network infrastructure to reduce the possibility of attack, particularly
at the early phases of the communication establishment. Link layer security is particularly
useful in those cases where location information is directly exchanged via DHCP, as de-
scribed in Chapter 5. While DHCP offers its own security mechanism, see RFC 3118 [85],
it is impractical for most deployments. However, for the interaction with HELD or LoST,
additional security capabilities are available at higher protocol layers since these protocols
run over HTTP.
LoST and HELD intentionally share a very similar discovery mechanism that can be used
by end devices as well as by intermediate entities like emergency services routing proxies.
In the case of dynamic discovery of a LIS and a LoST server in the access network, an
end device performs the following steps:
1. Acquire the access network domain name. DHCP, for example, can provide the end host
with this information.
2. Use this domain name as input to the DNS-based resolution mechanism. For LoST, this
resolution mechanism is described in RFC 5222 [52]. For HELD, it is defined in RFC
5986 [60]. In both cases, the URI-enabled NAPTR specification [82] is used.
An ESRP may also need to discover the network domain name for a LIS (for example
in transition scenarios where no Location by Reference has been made available to the end
host or is not included in the call setup procedure by the end host). The ESRP cannot rely
on DHCP for discovery of a LIS but instead has to use the IP address provided during the
call setup procedure. Reverse DNS look-ups have been proposed for this purpose. For a
LoST server discovery, the ESRP is pre-configured with a domain name, which simplifies
discovery because every LoST server is able to receive a correct answer from the distributed
mapping database, as explained in Chapter 5.
To avoid an attacker modifying the query or its result of any interaction with a LIS or
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a LoST server, Transport Layer Security (TLS) is strongly recommended. Because LoST
supports caching of responses, cache poisoning can be particularly problematic.
The entity interacting with a LoST server or a LIS has to check the TLS server’s identity,
as described in Section 3.1 of RFC 2818 [86].
Consider two independent application service providers called foo.example.com and
bar.example.com. They want to use a third party LoST service operated by an emergency
organization. This LoST server is reachable at https://lostserver.example.org.
foo.example.com includes an additional entry into the DNS server, as shown below:
foo.example.com.
IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "LoST:https"
"!.*!https://lostserver.example.org!" ""
The DNS entry for bar.example.com is:
bar.example.com.
IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "LoST:https"
"!.*!https://lostserver.example.org!" ""
When a LoST client establishes a TLS connection with https://lostserver.
example.org it would see a certificate that contains lostserver.example.org in
one of the many fields of a certificate (such as CN-ID, DNS-ID, SRV-ID, or URI-ID). The
main difference between these four types of certificate fields is the amount of information
embedded in the certificate and where. For the two application service providers the addi-
tional overhead of provisioning clients is kept at a minimum in such a model. To provide
the LoST client with high assurance that https://lostserver.example.org is indeed
offering LoST services on behalf of the two application service providers secure DNS has
to be used. Without secure DNS an adversary can modify the DNS response and change
the LoST server URI without the LoST client noticing it because the LoST client will use
the output of the discovery procedure as the reference identifier in the rules for checking
the certificate outlined in RFC 6125.
To avoid a dependency on secure DNS deployment an application service providers has
two options. We assume that user-configuration is not a viable option because configu-
ration failures may only be recognized during the service usage, which could be fatal for
emergency services.
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As a first option, the application service provider can provisioning its clients with the
LoST server URI rather than going through a layer of redirection via the DDDS discovery
procedure. This is a useful approach when the VoIP/multi-media application is provided by
the application service provider and frequent updates are common.
As a second option, it is possible for the application service providers and the organiza-
tion hosting the LoST server to delegate credentials. Fortunately, the ability to deal with
such deployment environments is not new and security solutions have been developed to
lower the attack surface (without having to wait for widespread Secure DNS deployment).
Domain Name Associations (DNA) [87] and PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH) [88] are two
solutions developed for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). Hosting
environments show very similar characteristics to the scenario described above, namely
1. Certification Authorities (CAs) will not issue certificates for foo.example.com and
bar.example.com to an organization operating lostserver.example.org.
2. foo.example.com and bar.example.com will not obtain certificates and private keys
and hand them over to the entity operating lostserver.example.org.
3. The organization operating lostserver.example.org does not want to manage certifi-
cates for foo.example.com, bar.example.com and potentially hundreds or thousands
of application service providers due to the added administrative overhead and increased
security risk.
While DNA and POSH have not been developed and standardized for use with LoST,
their work can be applied to LoST deployments. The following description outlines a pro-
posal for how POSH could used to secure the re-direction problem. In addition to the DDDS
discovery of the LoST server URI the LoST client has to perform an HTTPS GET request
at the source domain to the path “/.well-known/posh/servicedesc.json”. For the LoST ser-
vice the application-specific string for servicedesc could be “lost”. A LoST client using
the application service provider foo.example.com would therefore send the HTTPS GET
request shown here.
GET /.well-known/posh/lost.json HTTP/1.1
Host: foo.example.com
The following snippet shows an example response (taken from RFC 7711). The finger-
print element contains base64 encoded hashes of an X.509 certificate in DER format. These
fingerprints are subsequently used for checking the server certificate provided by the LoST
server running on https://lostserver.example.org during the TLS handshake.
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 195
{
"fingerprints": [
{
"sha-256": "4/mggdlVx8A3pvHAWW5sD+qJyMtUHgiRuPjVC48N0XQ=",
"sha-512": "25N+1hB2Vo42l9lSGqw+n3BKFhDHsyork8ou+D9B43TXeJ
1J81mdQEDqm39oR/EHkPBDDG1y5+AG94Kec0xVqA=="
}
],
"expires": 604800
}
A HELD or LoST server that is identified by an ”http:” URI cannot be authenticated.
Use of unsecured HTTP does not meet requirements in HELD and LoST. If an ”http:” URI
is the product of discovery, this leaves devices vulnerable to several attacks. Lower layer
protections, such as layer 2 traffic separation might be used to provide some security guar-
antees against adversaries on the wired-interface, but should not be seen as a replacement
for robust, cryptographic protection.
For use of LoST on the public Internet, LoST servers will not need to authenticate or
authorize LoST clients presenting mapping queries. For LoST deployments in closed sys-
tems, authentication of the underlying transport mechanism, such as HTTP basic and digest
authentication, may be used. Basic authentication should only be used in combination with
TLS. The usage of TLS with mutual certificate-based authentication is another option, par-
ticularly for use between server-to-server communication. Best practices for use of TLS are
provided in [89].
6.5.2. Secure Session Setup and Caller Identity
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [66] and the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [90]
are used to set up multimedia sessions or calls. SIP messages travel from the emergency
callers device via the intermediate SIP infrastructure towards the call takers device at the
PSAP.
The SIP protocol suite offers solutions for securing SIP signaling as well as conveying
caller identity information to the called party.
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The mechanisms can be clustered into three categories:
1. the process of verifying the user’s identity. The VSP’s infrastructure elements authenti-
cate the user. This can, for example, happen via the basic SIP authentication mechanisms
(such as digest authentication).
2. the process of asserting the previously verified identity to a third party. The authenticated
identity is not only important for the VSP but also for end-to-end communication to the
remote party. The VSP can assert this identity towards other parties using mechanisms
such as SIP Identity, described in RFC 4474 [91], or P-Asserted-Identity, specified in
RFC 3325 [53].
3. SIP signaling security. This ensures that an adversary cannot inject fake signaling mes-
sages, eavesdrop on the communication, replay messages, etc. Transport Layer Security
(TLS) is used for providing authentication, integrity, and confidentiality protection be-
tween neighboring SIP nodes. Since SIP signaling supports multiple transport protocols,
not just TCP, Datagram TLS [92] was introduced to allow TLS functionality to datagram
transport protocols.
There are two main technologies for communicating identity information in SIP:
P-Asserted-Identity (RFC 3325): After authenticating the user, the VSP’s SIP proxy
adds the P-Asserted-Identity (PAI) header to the SIP message. This header carries the
authenticated identity (SIP URI) of the user. The P-Asserted-Identity header is protected
only in a hop-by-hop fashion between the SIP proxies along the path. The mechanism
can only be used within a trust domain in which the SIP proxies and UAs communicate
securely and the proxies are mutually trusted. The design of PAI is therefore based on a
chain of trust rather than on a cryptographic end-to-end security solution.
SIP Identity (RFC 4474 and RFC 8224): SIP Identity extends the PAI concept with
a cryptographic identity assurance. SIP messages are sent to an Authentication Service,
which is responsible for verifying that the user agent software knows a shared secret,
for example, using the HTTP Digest authentication protocol. Based on successful user
authentication, identity information is written into the From header of the SIP request.
This part is identical to the PAI scheme. Then, the Authentication Service adds a digital
signature to a new SIP Identity header before forwarding it to the final recipient. Within
the forwarded SIP request, the Authentication Service also provides a reference (using an
HTTP URI in the Identity-Info header) to its own domain certificate. The recipient of the
SIP message, for example the call taker’s SIP user agent software, performs the following
actions to verify the authenticated identity: First, it fetches and validates the certificate
of the Authentication Service. Then, it verifies the signature of the SIP message and the
identity of the user. Finally, it checks the value of signed Date header to protect against
replay attacks.
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RFC 4474 provides identity assurrances only for domain names (and not for telefone
numbers), and it does not tolerate intermediaries, like Session Border Controllers, to alter
fields in the SIP call signaling. Telephone numbers are still in widespread use today and
Session Border Controllers are also frequently deployed to offer policy and interworking
functions at network boundaries. A more detailed description of the limitations of RFC
4474 can be found in Section 5.2 of RFC 7340 [77] (and in the initial publication dis-
cussing the challenges [93]). For this reason RFC 8224 [94] was written providing an
alternative, but conceptually similiar, solution. RFC 8224 together with RFC 8225 [95],
which defined the Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT), allow an Authentication Ser-
vice to create a signed assertion that includes information about the caller, called party,
hashes of keys exchanged for DTLS-SRTP [96,97], algorithm information, and SIP Date
header. PASSporT is an assertion based on the JSON Web Token (JWT) [98] originally
developed for use with the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework [99]. To demonstrate au-
thority over telephone numbers extensions to X.509 certificates where defined in RFC
8226 [100]. These extensions allow indicating the range of phone numbers an entity has
authority over.
6.5.3. Media Exchange
The main goal of the communication establishment explained in the previous section is
in the exchange of multi-media data between the two (or more) SIP end points. The of-
fered security services must not only protect the communication setup but also ensure the
protection of the media exchange. SDP, which is responsible for negotiating the media,
is a versatile protocol. SDP not only allows the setup of Real-Time Transport Protocol
(RTP) [101], which is used to transmit real-time media on top of UDP and TCP [102], but
also allows the setup of TCP [103] and additionally TCP/TLS connections for use with
media sessions [104].
The Secure RTP (SRTP) [105] is the established standard for securing RTP. In order to
allow SRTP to offer its service, cryptographic keys need to be established between the in-
volved communication parties via a key exchange protocol. Various key exchange protocols
have been proposed and analyzed [106], and among all the options, DTLS-SRTP, described
in RFC 5763 [96, 97], was chosen as the preferred IETF mechanism. However, the precur-
sor to DTLS-SRTP, the Security Description (SDES) protocol [107], is widely used today
despite its inferior security characteristics.
In order to protect against a number of attacks, it is therefore necessary for the SIP com-
munication end points to implement and use a key exchange protocol. DTLS-SRTP should
be used but for backwards-compatibility with older systems SDES) must also be imple-
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mented.
6.5.4. Mapping Database Security
Chapter 5 the use of the LoST protocol as part of the distributed mapping architecture is
described and LoST Sync allws to distribute mappings between LoST server nodes.
Exchanging mapping information is a security sensitive task. A minimum requirement is
to authenticate neighboring server nodes using available HTTP security mechanisms, such
as HTTP Digest [108], HTTP Basic [108] over TLS, or plain TLS with client and server
certificates [109].
The setup of the LoST server relationships requires some manual configuration and hence
the choice of the security mechanisms used between the two entities is a deployment spe-
cific decision. Nevertheless, the usage of certificates is an attractive option since it allows
the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with trust anchors dedicated to the emergency
services. Whenever a new server is add a new certificate is obtained from the corresponding
Certification Authority (CA). This certificate is then ready for use by the other infrastruc-
ture elements without additional administrative configuration burden. In any case, the two
communicating end points must authenticate each other and utilize the established secure
communication channel (i.e., an integrity protected exchange of data with the help of the
TLS Record Layer) to avoid the possibility of injecting bogus mappings.
A malicious entity could, however, intentionally modify mappings or inject bogus map-
pings. To avoid one entity claiming a service boundary belonging to some else, any node
introducing a new service boundary must digitally sign the mapping and thereby protect the
data with an XML digital signature. This ensures that a new mapping is associated to a par-
ticular owner with non-repudiation properties. Absent any automatic procedures, a system
administrator must approve the received mapping prior to its inclusion in the database. De-
termining who can speak for a particular region is inherently difficult unless there is a small
set of authorizing entities that all other participants can trust. Receiving systems should be
particularly suspicious if an existing coverage region is replaced with a new one containing
different contact points. With this end-to-end security mechanism, it is nevertheless guaran-
teed that mappings are modified by servers forwarding them as part of the synchronization
procedure.
Chapter7
Securing Data-Only Emergency Calls
7.1. Introduction
The Internet allows endpoints to communicate a variety of information through the network
without any changes to the underlying infrastructure. The work on IP-based emergency
services was initially focused on making voice communication functioning well. Later the
attention was shifted to other forms of communication, including real-time text, video and
real-time text. Even more recently is the idea to enhance emergency services communica-
tion with data collected by Internet of Things devices. In the emergency services community
the term ”data-only emergency call” is used to refer to devices that typically send data, not
voice or not just voice, to PSAPs to help facilitate emergency services support. The commu-
nicated information may be crash data of a vehicle, data from a smoke sensor, water level
information, structural information of a bridge, etc. In general, the idea is to increase situa-
tional awareness for the emergency services personnel and other interested parties (such as
the owner of a building).
Over the last few years, the number of Internet of Things (IoT) deployments has seen a
steady increase. Heterogeneous, innovative IoT hardware is being rolled out at a fast pace,
catalyzed by the new availability of open-source, general-purpose, embedded IoT software
and open standards for IoT communication.
In parallel, alarming recent reports in both academic work and mainstream media warn
about potential cyber-vulnerabilities and actual cyber-attacks involving IoT. Increased
awareness of the need for improved security is pushing legislators to pay closer attention
to the IoT environment and issue new regulations, such as the first IoT cybersecurity law
(SB-327) and, more recently, the European Commission’s Cybersecurity Act.
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In this chapter, we focus on constrained IoT devices (described in RFC 7228 [110]).
Typically, constrained IoT devices use microcontrollers - for instance Arm Cortex-M - on
which run real-time operating systems, such as FreeRTOS, Micrium’s µC/OS, RIOT, or
Mbed OS [111]. Compared to machines that run full-blown operating systems, such as
Linux, constrained IoT devices use a fraction of the power and are equipped with RAM
and Flash sizes (in the kilobyte range) reminiscent of the days of the Commodore VIC-20.
Constrained IoT devices, which cannot afford the energy drain of Wi-Fi, connect to the
network via low-power, wireless, link-layer technologies, such as Bluetooth Low-Energy,
IEEE 802.15.4, LoRa, 3GPP Cellular IoT (NB-IoT), or via wired buses.
IoT devices are, in many case, purpose built devices.
Although EU initiatives, such as IoT security recommendations from ENISA [112]11
pave the way for more secure IoT, reports about utterly insecure IoT devices keep pouring
in.
In 2014 [2] we surveyed standardization activities on Internet of Things. Most standard-
ization activities were only at the beginning and, in other cases, concepts were not yet ready
for standardization and required further research. At that time multi-hop mesh network-
ing using IEEE 802.15.4 and data compression over this low power networking technology
received a lot of attention.
5 years later, in 2019, we were wondering whether it is in the meanwhile possible to
develop an IoT product, such as a device used for emergency services, and secure it with
open standards. While there are still lots of proprietary technologies are on the market,
analysing the situation with open standards is beneficial for two reasons: first, the use of
standards reduces or avoids vendor lock-in, and second the specifications are publically
available.
As a metric for a secure IoT product the ENISA recommendations are used. Follow-
ing the earlier survey the focus is on Internet protocol specifications for network security
standardized by the IETF. The focus on the IETF is motivated both because it has been
successful in standardizing many other Internet protocols that underpin the Internet at large,
and because IETF protocols standards aim to work across the various IoT link-layer tech-
nologies.
11European Union Agency for Network & Information Security (ENISA) ’Baseline Security Recommenda-
tions for IoT’, and ’Good Practices for Security of Internet of Things in the context of Smart Manufacturing’.
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7.2. Deployment Scenarios
Deployments for IoT devices that are used in the context of emergency services are typically
deployed in three configurations:
• First, devices communicate with the ESINet via some service provider. This deployment
model is, for example, found in roadside assistence solutions where the service provider
offers a range of other functions besides emergency services support.
• Second, devices are connected to the cloud-based IoT service via some form of gateway.
The use of a gateway is typically needed when devices use short-range radio technologies,
such as IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth Mesh. The gateway ensures that the exotic IoT radio
technologies are integrated into the rest of the network infrastructure. Sometimes the
gateway also offers application layer protocol translation. A smoke detector connected to
a multi-hop mesh network using IEEE 802.15.4 is an example for such deployment.
• Third, IoT devices may be connected directly to the Internet using classical cellular tech-
nology or some of the recently developed low power wide area networking technologies,
such as NB-IoT. A sensor built into a bridge is an example for this deployment.
Figure 7.1 shows these deployments graphically. A more detailed discussion about dif-
ferent IoT deployment models can be found in [113].
ESINet
Server
IoT Device
IoT Device
Gateway
Service Provider
ServerIoT Device
Figure 7.1.: IoT Deployment Scenarios.
In rare cases IoT devices directly interact with each other.
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7.3. Security and Privacy Threats
7.3.1. Categories of Attacks
The common approach to designing a security solution is to conduct a threat analysis first.
Broadly, attacks can be categorized (as depicted in Fig. 7.2) into (i) network (or communi-
cation) attacks, (ii) software attacks, and (iii) hardware attacks.
Level 1
Cost/Effort
To  Attack
Cost/Effort
To  Secure
Communication Attacks
 Man-in-the-Middle
 Replay and DoS attacks
 Integrity violation
 Eavesdropping
Software Attacks
 Buffer overflow
and ROP
 SQL injection
 CSRF
 Privilege Escalation
 Session hijacking
Hardware Attacks
 Side-channel attacks
(such as timing, power analysis, 
and electromagnetic attacks)
 Fault injection
 Depackaging of the device
 Interfacing exposed hardware interfaces
(e.g., UART, SPI, I2C, and debug interfaces
such as JTAG)
Level 2
Level 3
Figure 7.2.: Categories of Threats.
Historically, the IETF focused on countering network attacks, and ignored software and
hardware attacks. For this reason, the main threat model, as described in RFC 3552 [114],
is a classical network attacker who can carry out active and passive attacks against the
communication interaction. Only recently, the IETF started tackling some security concerns
beyond network attacks, with the work on attestation, trusted execution environments, and
firmware updates (see Section 7.5.7).
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Privacy-related threats were added later with RFC 6973 [115] and are now being con-
sidered in the design of protocols throughout the IETF, including IoT protocols. In some
scenarios there is an overlap of privacy and security threats (for example, in a surveillance
scenario), and there are some privacy-specific threats, such as data minimization and user
participation. The threat of pervasive monitoring, as revealed by Snowden, certainly had a
huge impact on recognizing the importance of privacy in the design of Internet protocols,
as documented by the IETF community in RFC 7258 [116].
7.3.2. Threat Modelling
In considering which assets have to be protected, in many cases it is fairly obvious what
the threats are, even for someone who is less familiar with security. Unfortunately, threat
analysis is a process that is iterative and creative because product design decisions can create
new threats and the deployment environment may also change over time. As such, it is often
necessary to examine the threats not only once, at the beginning of the product development
process, but also to adjust the list of threats during the product lifecycle.
The following are three examples that illustrate the creative nature of the threat analysis
activity:
• Consider an emergency services product that is sold to consumers and deployed in their
home. Often these products are considered physically secure because a thief breaking into
someone’s home is probably less interested in tampering with a smoke detector. However,
if the same customer sometimes rents his home to strangers, via services like Airbnb,
the threat model has to be re-evaluated. This case illustrates a potential change in the
deployment environment. Accurate threat modelling requires a good understanding of
how IoT devices are used and other changes in the threat landscape over the lifetime of
the device.
• Consider another emergency services product that uses state-of-the-art crypto with a rock-
solid security protocol to authenticate and protect a firmware update mechanism. Imagine
further that the engineers of this product decide to deploy the same symmetric key, a class
key, on all devices of the same product family. In this scenario, an attacker only has
to buy and analyze a single device - for example, by conducting a (novel) side channel
analysis - to obtain the class key and ship a firmware update to all devices in the same
product family. In the worst case, the attacker can deliver the firmware updates over
the Internet without having to be in close proximity to the devices. This example shows
how the changing capabilities of attackers can change the threats posed. The people
conducting the threat modelling must be aware of the attackers’ techniques and their level
of sophistication.
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• Consider a final example where the threat analysis addresses all assets the company sell-
ing the product cares about. Later, it turns out that the product is vulnerable to a reflection
attack, which was not considered in the threat analysis because the computing resources
of third parties (the victims of the attack) were not included in the asset list. Those in-
volved in threat modelling have to be aware of the type of attacks encountered in specific
industries today.
7.4. Overview of ENISA Guidelines
Once an initial set of threats is collected, it is time to think about which of those threats
should be dealt with, and how. Although a company may decide not to offer a technical
solution to all security threats, it is useful to consult industry guidelines, such as the ENISA
guidelines [112], which can help to make reasonable decisions. While many security re-
quirements relate to the software and hardware implementation of a product, such as the
boot process and hardware crypto, there are also many protocol-specific elements that are
important security considerations.
Here is a list of the most important groups of security considerations:
1. Authentication and communication security
2. Object security
3. Authorization and access control
4. Key management
5. State-of-the-art crypto
6. Restrictive communication
7. Firmware and software updates
Many of the requirements that fall into these seven groups can also be found in other
best current practice guides. In fact, there is an astonishing overlap among the guidelines
produced by governments, industry groups, security experts, and researchers. This gives
us confidence that these guidelines indeed represent a consensus of sorts among security
experts.
Interestingly, the seven groups listed above can be mapped loosely to areas of work in
the IETF. In the next section a high-level overview of the ongoing standardization work is
provided.
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7.5. IETF IoT Security Standardization
The network security mechanisms surveyed aim to be applicable to all communication pat-
terns described in RFC 7452 [113]. The deployment scenarios illustrated in Section 7.2 are
most relevant in today’s deployments.
7.5.1. Authentication and Communication Security
The IETF work on offering communication security for IoT devices resulted in the consoli-
dation of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).
RFC 7925 [117] defines profiles of TLS and DTLS 1.2 for use in IoT environments with
separate guidance for three types of credentials supported by TLS/DTLS, namely pre-shared
secrets, raw public keys, and certificates. Password-based techniques, which have also been
defined for TLS/DTLS, are not discussed, because the industry is, in general, trying hard
to move away from password-based authentication. Since the publication of RFC 7925 in
2016, more and more embedded TLS/DTLS stacks that support the recommendations in
this specification are available for developers.
Over the last few years, the IETF has been busy standardizing the new version of TLS,
in the form of version 1.3, inspired by the needs of the web developer community, which
wanted to reduce the round-trip latency of the handshaking protocols. TLS required two
roundtrips before application data could be exchanged securely. The standardization pro-
cess for TLS 1.3, now published in RFC 8446 [118], was started in April 2014 and com-
pleted in August 2018. The list of changes and new features is long, which has contributed
to the longer standardization process. The reviews by a large number of participants, early
implementation and interoperability efforts, deployment investigations, and the use of for-
mal methods have contributed to the longer standardization process, but these contributions
significantly improved the quality of the specification.
The new features of TLS 1.3 are:
• A reduced number of roundtrips. The 0-RTT exchange enables transmitting application
data with the first message (at the loss of replay protection, which has to be provided
by the application layer). With the regular exchange, a client can send application data
after the first roundtrip. To convey the necessary information, the client has to add extra
information into the ClientHello message. The assumption is that the client will know
the server, or at least maintain some information about the server, and that configuration
information, such as algorithms, rarely changes.
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• The three Pre-Shared Key (PSK)-based modes (PSK-based authentication, session re-
sumption, and session resumption without server-side state) have been merged into a
single mode. Password-based authentication, which was available in TLS/DTLS 1.2 with
SRP [119] and J-PAKE [120], was removed.
• Encryption of handshake information is made as early as possible. While this makes
network monitoring and debugging more complex, it also increases privacy protection.
The ability to add padding to messages was also added to make traffic analysis more
difficult.
• A modified ciphersuite concept, in which the negotiation of the algorithms has been un-
tangled from the authentication and key exchange. The ciphersuite list was thereby also
cleaned up.
• Increased use of perfect forward secrecy, which requires a Diffie-Hellman exchange.
• Removed key transport, a decision which was met with considerable scepticism by en-
terprise network operators and firewall vendors since it requires more sophisticated inter-
ception techniques to perform deep packet inspection.
• Use of authenticated encryption with additional data as the go-to-choice for symmetric
algorithms.
• Removed custom Diffie-Hellman groups and compression.
• Redefined renegotiation with the introduction of a post-handshake authentication mecha-
nism.
• Added solid version negotiation.
• The key derivation algorithm now makes use of the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF) construct defined in RFC 5869 [121] and a more struc-
tured key hierarchy, which enables researchers to better analyze the handshake using for-
mal methods because of the various keys are independent. From an implementation point
of view, this change led to a larger code size compared to earlier TLS versions.
With this long list of features it was interesting to get more data about the impact on
code size, message overhead, and the number of cryptographic operations. With a TLS 1.3
stack implemented on top of the Mbed TLS library an early conclusion can be drawn that
TLS 1.3 provides an improvement for IoT deployments in terms of security, privacy and
performance at roughly the same code size and with the same RAM requirements.
The work on DTLS 1.3 [122] was started with a slight delay and is currently being final-
ized. DTLS aims to provide communication security for connectionless transport protocols.
This allows developers to secure protocols that are primarily used over the User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), such as the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). The design of DTLS
1.3 reuses TLS 1.3 as much as possible. There are, however, several aspects that are worth
highlighting:
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• DTLS requires an enhancement for denial of service protection. This is accomplished
with a dedicated message in earlier versions of DTLS, namely the HelloVerifyRequest
handshake message. In DTLS 1.3, this message has been replaced by the HelloRetryRe-
quest message, which was already introduced in TLS 1.3.
• The record layer encoding has been optimized. The version number and type fields have
been removed, the length of the epoch and sequence number fields have been shortened,
and the header uses a variable length encoding. This lowers the over-the-wire overhead.
• The retransmission mechanism has been redefined. Prior to DTLS 1.3, the retransmission
granularity was at the level of an entire flight (in other words, retransmission required a
series of messages). In DTLS 1.3, an explicit ACK message has been defined to enable
acknowledgements of handshake messages explicitly.
• DTLS 1.3 introduces a connection ID concept, which enables lookup of the security as-
sociation of an incoming record based on a newly introduced identifier carried in the
record layer header rather than using the source IP address and source port. The connec-
tion ID concept is particularly useful in an IoT context where devices sleep for extended
time periods and likely run into the problem of an expired state with network address
translators. In light of the popularity of this extension, it has also been backported to
DTLS 1.2 [123], although with weaker privacy characteristics because DTLS 1.2 does
not support post-handshake messages. Maintaining the same level of privacy while intro-
ducing this new feature was important in the design, and also led to the introduction of
a sequence number encryption scheme for DTLS 1.3. This extension enables the use of
an established security context for significantly longer without the need to rerun full or
resumption handshakes, and results in a significant performance improvement.
We expect TLS and DTLS 1.3 to find widespread usage on the Internet and in IoT de-
ployments.
When security requirements include end-to-end communication security, a reasonable
question is what the ’endpoints’ of this exchange are. In some cases, it may be sufficient to
offer security at the link layer since the two ends are topologically close to each other and
sometimes a more complex communication path is utilized. A properly described system
architecture will give insight into what the participating entities are.
Here is a typical example of an IoT device in an emergency services context that com-
municates with support infrastructure provided by the manufacturer. The IoT device uses
a radio technology to connect to the Internet; for example, to a Wi-Fi network. Once it
connects to the Internet, it contacts a device management server. The device management
server is responsible for configuring the device, and for managing software updates. The
entire lifecycle of the IoT device is managed by the device management server. Depending
on the deployment preferences this device management server may also be used to retrieve
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sensor values and to triggering actuators, if there are any. If we want to secure communica-
tion end-to-end, security protection has to start and end at the two endpoints, namely at the
IoT device and the device management server. TLS and/or DTLS would be a fine choice
for providing end-to-end security.
In addition to the TLS/DTLS, the IETF now offers another communication security so-
lution called ’Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments’ (OSCORE [124]).
The development of OSCORE was initially started as an application layer security solution
protecting CoAP messages end-to-end. Later, it was extended to work also when CoAP
traffic is mapped to HTTP because end-to-end communication in IoT deployments rarely
uses CoAP alone. Since the SIP protocol is often used for emergency services OSCORE
is not a good choice since OSCORE does not support SIP and SIP itself is not a RESTful
protocol.
For those cases where CoAP is used instead of SIP, and DTLS/TLS is considered insuf-
ficient, OSCORE may be a possible candidate for a security protocol. OSCORE re-uses
COSE [125] for protecting CoAP messages, or more precisely some CoAP headers and the
CoAP payload. The reason it offers it cannot protect the entire CoAP message is that the
CoAP also defines intermediaries, so-called CoAP proxies, and those proxies need to in-
spect part of the message. CoAP defines the interaction between CoAP and DTLS slightly
differently to how HTTP did. In CoAP, DTLS is terminated at the proxy while in HTTP
a TLS exchange is transparently passed through (unless it is a reverse proxy). Note that
in context of OSCORE, these proxies can also be special CoAP-to-HTTP proxies as long
as they do not change the nature of the REST API interaction (and for the CoAP-to-HTTP
mapping guidance described in [126]).
Since the OSCORE specification does not define a key management mechanism, the
ACE-OAuth framework [127] is re-used to facilitate that functionality. The design follows
the use of DTLS/TLS between the ACE-OAuth client and the resource server whereby the
authorization server issues a proof-of-possession token along with the key to the client. The
client then uses that key to derive keys for OSCORE, and then secures the communication
with the resource server using OSCORE. This solution [128] is now being standardization
in the ACE working group.
7.5.2. Object Security
Communication security protocols typically protect the exchanges of parties over a longer
period of time. These security protocols, as can be seen with TLS, often operate in various
stages where computationally-heavy tasks are performed infrequently as part of a hand-
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shake, while application data protection is accomplished with symmetric keys derived dur-
ing the handshake. We described those communication security protocols in Section 7.5.1.
In this section we focus on security technologies that are tailored toward one-shot pay-
loads. For example, consider a scenario where firmware images are distributed by the device
management server and must be secured end-to-end, from the developer to the IoT device.
Since the firmware image may be stored on servers for an extended period of time and must
be self-contained, a different security mechanism, such as COSE [125], is more appropriate,
and we cover it next.
In computer science, we like to come up with encoding and serialization formats, and the
most recent trend is the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [125], which was
designed with a small code and message size in mind. To protect data that is encoded in
CBOR, a new signing and encryption format, which is conceptually similar to JavaScript
Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE), the signing and encryption format for JSON en-
coded data, had to be developed. (The functionality for JOSE is spread over different speci-
fications; the most important documents are JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [129] and JSON
Web Signature (JWS) [130]). JSON and JOSE was the way to encode data before CBOR
and COSE came along. COSE can be seen as a set of building blocks that applications use
in the way they find useful (with an eye on code size). A device implementing a firmware
update solution may, for example, rely on asymmetric crypto and would, therefore, imple-
ment the signature verification capability offered by COSE and none of the other security
services that use symmetric key crypto.
COSE offers the following security services:
• Digital signatures
• Counter signatures
• Message Authentication Code (MAC)
• Encryption
• Rudimentary key distribution methods
Most security services are offered in two versions, depending on whether one or multiple
entities create or receive them. For example, the COSE Sign1 signature structure is used
when only one signature will be placed on a message, whereas COSE Sign allows for one
or more signatures to be applied. COSE Sign1 and COSE Sign are different structures and
cannot be converted from one to the other.
The standardization work on COSE was finished 2017 and the RFC was published mid-
2017; therefore the availability of embedded COSE libraries is limited today. libcose and
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cose-c are two early implementations, released mid-2018, tailored for use in the microcon-
troller environment.
Since CBOR is a good fit for securing data when the goal is to protect one-shot mes-
sages, the use of COSE is one option for protecting firmware updates, or more precisely, for
signing metadata about the firmware and, optionally, encrypting the firmware image. COSE
can also protect access tokens used with the ACE-OAuth framework. Both examples are
described in more detail in subsequent sections.
Since emergency services standards do not encode data in JSON or CBOR there are five
approaches for securing such data:
1. New specifications are defined that define a new serialization format. For example, it is
possible to encode a PIDF-LO in JSON or in CBOR. This approach allows the use of
JOSE and COSE, respectively.
2. No changes to the existing specifications are made and data is treated as an uninterpreted
byte sequence. This specifically allows the use of signatures over detached data.
3. Available security mechanisms suitable for use with the existing serialization formats are
used. For example, in case of XML this would be XML digital signatures and XML
encryption. Other data can be protected using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
CMS uses ASN.1 under the hood, which is also used in X.509-based certificates.
4. A compression technique is used on data that is encoded in XML before it is signed and/or
encrypted. Such approach may only require a new media-type to be used, or a new media
type to be registered with IANA.
5. Communication security is provided by TLS/DTLS where possible with object security
only for selected parts, such as firmware updates.
7.5.3. Authorization and Access Control
Securing communication interactions is an important step to mitigate basic attacks. Many
IoT devices used for emergency services, such as vehicles eCall systems as well as sensors,
may need to be accessed by technicians and even end users. This interaction raises a number
of authorization questions, including
• How can access to the device be secured, without inadvertently allowing unauthorized
access?
• Is it possible to support different users or groups of users?
• Can the access rights of one user be set differently from other users?
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• Can access control policies be managed centrally?
• Does the solution scale for a greater number of devices?
• How can strong authentication mechanisms be utilized?
The IETF Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) work-
ing group has developed a solution to answer the above-listed questions, based on the widely
used OAuth 2.0 protocol [99], and brings fine-grained authorization to the IoT world. This
body of work is called ACE-OAuth [127] and the specifications are already further along
with interoperability tests taking place. While OAuth 2.0 was designed with a wide range
of use cases in mind - such as the web, native apps on smart phones, tablets and desktop
computers, browser-based apps, and even devices with a limited user interface, such as TVs,
picture frames, and game consoles - a few enhancements had to be made to tailor OAuth to
the constrained IoT environment.
First, let us briefly summarize how ACE-OAuth is expected to work at a high-level. The
OAuth system consists of four main entities, namely the client, the resource server, the au-
thorization server, and the resource owner. The client wants to access a protected resource at
a resource server. In an example of a vehicle-based emergency services solution, the client
could be software running on the tablet of a technician, and the resource server is software
running on a microcontroller inside the vehicle. The authorization server is responsible for
issuing tokens that allow the client to access the emergency services system in the vehicle
such that the authorization policies stored at the authorization server are met. These au-
thorization policies may be created by the car manufacturer (acting as a resource owner)
or phrased differently the resource owner decides about who gets access to the protected
resource.
The token, which is issued by the authorization server and consumed by the resource
server, is called the access token. The OAuth working group standardized a token format,
called JSON Web Token (JWT) [98], which encodes claims in JSON, and the token itself
is protected using the mechanisms developed in the IETF JOSE working group. Since the
OAuth 2.0 specification does not mandate a token format, it is possible to design and use a
token format that works best in each environment. In the case of ACE-OAuth, a counterpart
to the JWT was developed with the CBOR Web Token (CWT) [131], which uses CBOR
instead of JSON, and COSE and instead of JOSE. The result is a smaller token size.
Access tokens used in OAuth 2.0-based deployments are mostly bearer tokens. Proof-of-
possession (PoP) tokens were introduced later [132, 133], and in the IoT environment it is
possible to use PoP tokens from the beginning. The key characteristic of a PoP token is that
the token itself is associated with a symmetric or asymmetric key, and the entity presenting
the token must demonstrate possession of the key. When a public key is associated with the
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PoP token, this means that the client must use the private key along with a digital signature
when demanding access to a protected resource on a resource server. An attacker, therefore,
needs to steal the key associated with the token in addition to the token itself. The use of
PoP tokens requires an enhancement to the original OAuth 2.0 specification because extra
information about the keys to be bound to the tokens must be passed around.
The second enhancement to the OAuth 2.0 specification accommodates for the different
protocols being used in the IoT environment. While HTTP is used for IoT communication,
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) and the Message Queuing Telemetry Trans-
port (MQTT) protocol are also popular. OAuth 2.0 has not been developed for use with
these protocols, and the necessary extensions are defined in the IETF ACE working group.
Concurrently with the work on ACE-OAuth, work on an Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
format [134], which introduces attestation-specific claims for use in the CWT structure, has
been contributed to the IETF. The promise is to enable IoT devices to communicate informa-
tion about their hardware and software characteristics to other communication parties. This
work is still at an early stage, and the ambition is to create a working group. These EAT
tokens could provide information about the manufacturer, used hardware security features,
and hashes computed over the bootloader and firmware code of the device to a communi-
cation party, opening up additional decision-making possibilities. For emergency services
applications the extra security properties provided by this attestation information could be
highly valuable.
7.5.4. Key Management
IoT devices need several keys to enable lifecycle management and remote management.
As explained in the Internet Protocol for Smart Objects (IPSO) Alliance (now OMA Spec-
Works) publication on credential management for IoT devices [135], a common security
assumption is that IoT devices have been provisioned with at least one long-term credential
during manufacturing. This long-term credential is then used to provision further keys to
the device in a process called bootstrapping, commissioning, onboarding, or enrollment.
This new terminology hides the fact that the developed protocols provide two main steps:
1. The device authenticates itself to another party and vice versa using a pre-provisioned
credential. In many cases, this credential is provided during manufacturing. For example,
a device may be provisioned with a unique device certificate along with a private key. This
credential is then used to authenticate the device to the other party in a communication
interaction. To offer mutual authentication, the device must also be provisioned with one
or multiple trust anchors. There is, however, one important exception where devices start
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without having credentials provisioned, and they use an out-of-band mechanism to obtain
security guarantees. Bluetooth Low Energy, for example, uses this approach where in
proximity, a PIN entry, is used as a security guarantee to skip the provisioning step.
2. A protocol exchange is required to convey or derive new credentials. These new keys,
often called operational credentials, are used to secure the communication of the device,
including data and configuration exchanges.
Many vendors and standards developing organizations have designed protocols that pro-
vide this bootstrapping functionality. Some of these protocols are specified for use with a
specific radio technology (as the Bluetooth Low Energy example shows) and others are ra-
dio technology agnostic (or at least to a large extend). Organizations and vendors that have
developed these bootstrapping techniques include OMA SpecWorks (with the Lightweight
Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol [136]), Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF),
Thread Group, Intel (with their Secure Device Onboarding), IEEE (Device Provisioning
Protocol), Alljoyn, WiSun, Zigbee, and Bluetooth (Mesh).
Unsurprisingly, the IETF has also developed a number of these protocols for use in
IoT environments, as outlined in this survey [137]. Examples include ZeroTouch, ANI-
MA/BRSKI, Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST), EAP-NOOB, ACE-OAuth, Certifi-
cate Management Protocol (CMP), PANA, and EAP/AAA.
7.5.5. State-of-the-Art Crypto
Cryptography is a conservative business. Developing a new cryptographic algorithm, writ-
ing proofs, publishing papers, and standardizing the cryptography is not enough to make
it see widespread adoption, or any adoption at all. Years of community-wide review is
typically required, which makes cryptography quite costly in terms of development. An
engineer given the task of developing software for an IoT product is therefore well served
to rely on off-the-shelf crypto rather than going for the cutting edge. Resisting the urge to
develop your own cryptographic algorithm is key.
With the work on the TLS 1.3 specification [118], the IETF TLS group cleaned up the
ciphersuite list, and the recently published TLS 1.3 specification, therefore, contains a list
of algorithms that can be considered a good choice. We use the crypto recommendations
from the TLS 1.3 specification since the RFC has recently been published and it represents
the consensus of the IETF community in terms of crypto protocols. While these algorithm
recommendations are tailored to TLS 1.3, they are typically also applied to other protocol
designs. The recommendations have been developed in cooperation with the Internet Re-
search Task Force’s (IRTF) Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). Here is what the spec
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suggests:
• For symmetric key cryptography, the industry has moved to authenticated encryption
with additional data (AEAD) ciphers. AES-128-GCM-SHA256 is the ’must’-implement
algorithm, and the same AEAD algorithm with a longer key size, namely AES-256-
GCM-SHA256, is a ’should’-implement. As a backup cipher, CHACHA20-POLY1305-
SHA256 has become popular and it is also a ’should’-implement.
• For digital signatures with certificates, the TLS 1.3 spec indicates that RSA-PKCS#1-
SHA256, RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256 and ECDSA-SECP256r1-SHA256 are mandatory
to implement.
• For the key exchange, the NIST P-256r1 curve (secp256r1) is mandatory to implement.
Implementations ’should’ support key exchange with X25519, which is an alternative
curve (Montgomery).
There are two caveats:
• First, IoT devices often implement the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) in hardware
rather than the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). The CCM mode of operation with AES
has been put into most, if not all, IoT specifications as the preferred algorithm. To reduce
the overhead caused by the message authentication code (MAC), CCM also supports a
variant with a shortened MAC, referred to as CCM-8. CCM-8 is commonly used in IoT
deployments.
• Second, most IoT deployments use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) rather than RSA.
As such, the algorithm of choice for certificates today is ECDSA-SECP256r1-SHA256.
In the future, we may see convergence in the area of symmetric crypto algorithms used
on IoT devices and on the general Internet with ChaCha20 and Poly1305. It is also worth
noting that there have been standardization efforts around lightweight symmetric cryptog-
raphy - for example, by NIST - but it is too early to say whether these algorithms will
be useful beyond a niche market. Modern low-end IoT hardware is equipped with a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG), very often supports SHA-256 and AES-128, and may
support ECC-crypto. This is already a big improvement compared to the availability of even
TRNGs in microcontrollers a few years ago. The use of a TRNG is essential for security
protocols because almost all security protocols rely on a source of randomness, for example,
for nonces and key generation.
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7.5.6. Restricting Communication
Most IoT devices are built to fulfil a specific purpose; typically to collect sensor input,
process it, and act on the results. In edge or fog computing, even sensor fusion is often
outsourced to a gateway, or it is delegated to the server-side infrastructure. Naturally, the
communication interaction of such IoT devices is also limited, particularly since these de-
vices have limited RAM, which prevents communication with multiple hosts concurrently.
The earlier work of the IETF Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) working group aimed
to develop an architecture and protocols to ”assess the posture of endpoint devices for the
purposes of monitoring compliance to an organization’s posture policy and optionally re-
stricting access until the endpoint has been updated to satisfy the posture requirements”.
At the time that NEA was standardized, the endpoints were mostly laptops and desktops
in enterprise networks. It became very difficult to write policies that described the posture
policy in an organization for all endpoints, given their varying communication interaction
methods, and then to keep that policy up-to-date. In the end, the NEA standardization work
had less security impact than expected.
With the much simpler communication interaction of IoT devices, the idea of restricting
the communication of these devices surfaced again in the work on the Manufacturer Usage
Description (MUD [138]). An organization interested in formulating a policy for what
an IoT device is allowed to do faces the challenge that it requires some analysis work to
determine which protocols a device is using, and with which hosts it is communicating
on the Internet. Only the company developing the final product has complete information
available about the communication behavior since it is in full control of developing (or
selecting) the software stack.
Although IoT security recommendations highlight the need to remove unused services,
network operators still inherently distrust the manufacturers of these devices. The current
assumption seems to be that IoT devices will not be developed with security in mind. This
lack of confidence in the ability to develop secure IoT devices has led network equipment
manufacturers, network operators, and security start-ups to develop various schemes for
”learning” whether an IoT device behaves correctly. While products on the market use
some form of deep packet inspection and analysis of communication interactions by inter-
mediaries somewhere in the access network, the standardized solution expects the equip-
ment manufacturer to publish MUD files that offer information about the communication
interaction of the device. These MUD files are communicated from the IoT device to the
network using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), or as part of the network au-
thentication procedure via extensions in certificates. Equipment in the network then fetches
these MUD files and uses the machine-readable description to create firewall policies auto-
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matically. For example, it is expected that a device that misbehaves due to an attack will be
firewalled, or at least that alerts will be generated. A manufacturer has to update these MUD
files for each product whenever the communication interaction changes; for example, when
the device interacts with different servers or uses alternative communication protocols.
At the time of writing, the standardization work on MUD is largely completed and it
remains to be seen whether manufacturers who previously did not care about implementing
a firmware update solution and alike can now be convinced to publish MUD files about
their products in a timely fashion. At the same time, many companies are trying hard to
improve the security of endpoints with new hardware security mechanisms and with readily
available open source code that takes most of the difficult security programming out of the
hands of developers.
7.5.7. Firmware and Software Updates
Providing a firmware update solution for IoT devices is essential to dealing with bugs and
the changing environment. While this seems obvious, we still see lots of devices in the
market that do not enable updating their code. Best current practice guides not only demand
the ability to update firmware, but also the ability to do so securely. In 2017, the IETF
formed the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) working group to standardize an
IoT firmware update solution. The initial starting point was to outline the architecture [139]
and the metadata describing a firmware image along with its security mechanism [140].
The metadata contained in a data structure that is protected, at least against modifications,
is called a manifest. IoT device management solutions, such as LwM2M [136], can then be
used to deliver the manifest and the firmware image to IoT devices.
The manifest contains several elements to instruct an IoT device to install only firmware
that comes from an authorized source, has not been modified, is (optionally) confidentiality
protected, is suitable for the hardware, and meets various other conditions. One item of the
IETF SUIT working group is an information model document, which explains the purpose
and the semantics of the manifest elements.
The IETF SUIT aims to cover a wide range of use cases, not only because the IoT market
is quite diverse in its deployment needs, but also because of the hardware being used. Since
many IoT devices today contain multiple microcontrollers to perform different tasks, such
as radio communication and application processing, the manifest also has to provide an
indication of which microcontroller must be updated. Likewise, a single microcontroller
may have software from different vendors, such as a Bluetooth software stack from the chip
manufacturer and application code from a developer. Transferring large firmware images
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can be a challenge for low-power radio technologies, and some vendors, therefore, prefer to
use differential updates or to update selected components instead. The manifest also has to
cover these use cases.
Dealing with different versions of firmware over the lifetime of the device is another a
requirement. These scenarios require some form of dependency mechanism and version
management. The use of an encrypted firmware image is also becoming more popular
because it reduces the attack surface since knowledge of the code running on an IoT device,
even if it must be reverse engineered with tools like Radare, Binary Ninja, or IDA Pro, gives
an attacker a lot of additional insight. Obtaining a firmware image is often the first task in
an attack chain.
While the standardization process in the IETF SUIT group is still ongoing, there has been
interest in reusing existing building blocks, such as CBOR and COSE (discussed previously
in this article), to encode and protect firmware images, respectively. Even if vendors only
ever update their own device in a siloed IoT deployment, it is still beneficial for them to
rely on a standardized solution to give others confidence that the solution has been designed
properly with input from a wide range of industry players, follows best current practices, and
potentially uses off-the-shelf code. The reuse of code also helps to reduce the development
effort since participants in the group intend to release a reference implementation as a by-
product of the standardization activities. Some of the participants have verified the ongoing
specification work at IETF hackathons.
The IETF SUIT working group is somewhat related to the Trusted Execution Environ-
ment Provisioning (TEEP) working group since the goal in both cases is to update code on
a device. The big difference between SUIT and TEEP is that TEEP focuses on hardware
that uses Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Arm TrustZone or Intel SGX. A
TEE is designed to provide a hardware-isolation mechanism to separate a regular operating
system from security-sensitive application components, such as key storage. The goal is,
therefore, to update code that runs inside these TEEs, the so-called trusted apps. Most of the
hardware equipped with a TEE today - for example, gateway devices in IoT deployments -
is rather powerful compared to a constrained IoT device; however, with the recent addition
of TrustZone technology to the Arm M-profile architecture, constrained microcontrollers
are gaining trusted execution capabilities.
The TEEP working group is standardizing an application layer protocol, the Open Trust
Protocol (OTrP [141]), which manages the interaction between a TEE and a server-side
component, the so-called Trusted Application Manager (TAM), to query the TEE for in-
stalled trusted apps and to manage the lifecycle of these trusted apps. Trusted apps are
only installed if the TAM has successfully attested the hardware and software functionality
of the TEE. The design of OTrP is complicated by the interaction of the trusted app and
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code running on the regular operating system, the different ways of delivering software to
higher-end devices, such as phones and tablets, and because devices may be equipped with
multiple TEEs. The group agreed to look only at the use of public key cryptography in
OTrP. The TEEP architecture specification [142] provides further details.
7.6. Conclusion
Designing a secure IoT product is hard, as press releases about hacked IoT products demon-
strate. In the meanwhile, many guidelines for securing IoT devices have been published
and we focused our attention to the ’Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT’ docu-
ment published by the EU Agency for Network & Information Security (ENISA) but other
guidelines make similar recommendations. In this survey we have looked at IETF standard-
ized security solutions specifically designed for constrained IoT devices in the categories
communication security, authorization, key management, cryptography, restricting com-
munication, as well as firmware and software updates. These seven categories have been
created based on the list of recommendations by ENISA.
We asked ourselves whether it is even possible to develop a reasonably security product
based on the standardization work done by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). As
far as the scope of the IETF work goes, we believe this is possible. Standardization work
has advanced to a point that there is typically no need to build home-grown solutions.
There are, however, challenges and gaps as well. At the time of writing some standardiza-
tion work is not yet completed. In other cases, standardization work is ahead of implemen-
tations. More resources are needed to implement high-quality embedded libraries. Even a
protocol that is theoretically secure is only secure in practice when implemented without
relevant bugs. As such, do not ever write your own crypto implementation and use a well
tested, widely used libraries instead since protocol implementation bugs and subtleties in
specifications are common.
Since even well-tested security protocol implementations have bugs it is important to not
underplay the importance of firmware and software updates. It is probably the number one
security feature of a product.
In the context of security libraries it is also worth to point out that these libraries need to
be developer-friendly and available for use with the large number of IoT operating systems.
Today, developers often face a lot of pain when integrating security libraries into the IoT
hardware of choice.
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For engineers who want to advance their development quickly we recommend starting
with an IoT device management framework, such as LwM2M, rather than selecting indi-
vidual building blocks and combining them to something meaningful. This approach has
the advantage that a working system is built rather quickly. Configuration and optimization
potential is still available with each of the IETF-developed security protocols, assuming an
engineer has security know-how and is familiar with embedded development.

Chapter8
Conclusion
8.1. Summary
Emergency services support is one of the most valued functions of the telephony system.
With the transition from circuit switched telephony to IP-based multimedia communication,
many design decisions had to be re-evaluated. The desire for separation between applica-
tion service providers and providers offering Internet connectivity allowed application ser-
vice providers to expand their services to customers around the world. As a consequence,
additional requirements for the global use of emergency services were placed on the design
of an IP-based solution. This thesis describes the design of the IETF emergency services
architecture that can be used by any application, including vehicles and Internet of Things
devices. Due to the modular design various building blocks can also be used by other archi-
tectural variants and in transition deployments. Designing functionality without considering
security and privacy is not a feasible approach anymore. Hence, security and privacy fea-
tures have been the main focus throughout the design of the presented emergency services
architecture.
The first few chapters provide an introduction, list requirements, and summarize related
work.
Chapter 5 gives an introduction to IETF IP-based emergency services and illustrates how
emergency call routing works. This architecture meets the requirements outlined in Chap-
ter 2 and offers advantages over the alternative solutions presented in Chapter 3 due to its
generic nature and global applicability. A comparison with alternative architectures is pro-
vided in Chapter 4. A core component of the IETF emergency services architecture is the
ability to obtain routing information based on the location information and service URN
provided. The LoST protocol provides this functionality. Details of the LoST protocol im-
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plementation are available in Annex A. The performance analysis shows promising results
even on an off-the-shelf desktop PC: The minimal roundtrip time (RTT) of the LoST re-
quest/response is 39 msec and the maximum is 856 msec. The median is 55 msec and the
mean is 72.17 msec. The first and third quartile is 48 msec and 65 msec, respectively.
Security and privacy is a common concern with any Internet-based application, and a sys-
tem that aims to save lives is quite naturally subject to more scrutiny. In Chapter 6 security
is analyzed from a broad perspective, and threats that surfaced in discussions are captured.
Luckily, most threats can be mitigated with the use of various security technologies. How-
ever, there is one threat of particular concern that relates to the ability to attack the limited
resources of call takers and first responders. In the November 2011 issue of the Communi-
cations of the ACM magazine [143], we highlighted the problem of caller identity spoofing,
as used in swatting. Identity spoofing, fake location, and SIM-less emergency calls remain
a problem.
Chapter 7 enhances the classical emergency services concept to include Internet of Things
devices like temperature sensors, burglar alarms, and chemical spill sensors. With the weak
security features offered by today’s IoT devices, this chapter provides a survey of security
protocols made available by the IETF. The survey gives hope: developers can pick from
range of standardized security technologies to make their IoT devices more robust against
attacks.
The work on this IP-based emergency services architecture represents an example of
security and privacy by design.
8.2. Future Work
A large body of standardization work has been finalized during the last few years; vari-
ous product implementations are available and early deployments already exist. Still, there
is much additional deployment work ahead, particularly since today’s emergency services
networks are disconnected islands. Although the increasing deployment experience will
lead to adjustments to the envisioned architecture, new communication protocols, such as
WebRTC [43], will introduce additional challenges because of use of non-SIP-based proto-
cols.
Accomplishing widespread deployment of the envisioned IP-based architecture, as de-
scribed in this thesis, requires more than just a technical solution documented in specifica-
tions. More than any other environment, the emergency services field is a complex ecosys-
tem impacted by the business models of various actors (such as network operators, applica-
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tion service providers, emergency service equipment manufacturers), regulatory mandates,
and the directions taken by individual countries.
The ability to obtain highly accurate location information has substantially increased with
the existence of interoperable standards, the availability of implementations in products, and
the rise of smartphones. However, this has not yet led to better location support for emer-
gency services in many countries. Regulatory mandates governing how network operators
deploy location servers for use with emergency services vary substantially throughout the
world. In Europe, locations provided to emergency services are either civic addresses for
land-line callers or locations based on Cell-ID for mobile phone users. The quality of Cell-
ID-based positioning varies substantially, and can, in urban areas, lead to a poor accuracy of
several kilometers [144], [145]. Providing proper incentives for fixed and mobile operators
and for enterprises to deploy location technology has been a struggle for a long time, and
this situation has not changed during the period of writing.
Data collection by all stakeholders would be essential in allowing researchers to gain
insight into the current state of emergency services deployments. While a certain amount
of data is already collected today, it is either insufficient or not available to researchers for
analysis. Without deployment statistics, researchers have little ability to diagnose problems,
evaluate solutions with regard to effectiveness, or develop alternative technologies. For
example, consider the following questions: How much can emergency services operation,
and particularly dispatch, be improved with better location accuracy? At what point does
the improved location lead to little improvement in dispatch times? These questions are
unanswered today since there is no consistent data collection about the actual location of
the emergency caller (whoes location was reported), or the time it took to reach the person
of help.
Location is, however, not the only area where work is needed. Concerns about security
and privacy are common with emergency services, and of course with the Internet in general.
Unfortunately, the concerns are often unspecific and therefore hard to discuss and to dispel.
Untangling the wide range of possible concerns is the first step in making progress. In
Chapter 6, security is approached holistically.
There are three areas of security where further work is required.
• First, many of the existing VoIP and application service offerings provide only a limited
form of identity proofing, and their user authentication technology is often weak as well.
Without the ability to link a specific call to a real-world person, it is difficult to punish
misbehavior. There is currently a larger body of ongoing work to develop and deploy
better authentication and identity services on the Internet.
• Second, emergency services networks are IP-based networks and, if not operated cor-
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rectly, and updated frequently, they quickly become vulnerable to various forms of at-
tacks.
• Finally, companies developing Internet of Things devices need to be incentivized to fol-
low the current best practice guidelines. Hacked consumer devices already present a
danger for the wider Internet via distributed denial of service attacks. When these devices
are used for emergency services, the consequences are even more severe.
In most countries, telecommunications regulators at all levels, such as the Federal Com-
munication Commission (FCC), the European Commission, and the UK Office of Com-
munications (OFCOM) have a strong influence on how emergency services are provided in
individual countries, who pays for them, and what obligations the various parties have. Reg-
ulation is evolving, and the requirements for emergency services support and for providing
automatic location information vary.
The separation between Internet access and application providers is one of the most im-
portant differences from existing circuit switched telephone networks. A side effect of this
separation is the increased speed of innovation at the application layer; the number of new
communication mechanisms is thus steadily increasing. Many emergency service orga-
nizations have recognized this trend and advocate for the inclusion of new communication
mechanisms, including video, real-time text, and instant messaging, to offer improved emer-
gency calling support for citizens. Again, this requires regulators to re-think the distribution
of responsibilities, funding and liability.
For many communication systems in use today, however, it is difficult to trace malicious
activities back to the offender. This is not a completely new problem, as pay phones and
prepaid cell phones have long offered mischief-makers the opportunity to place hoax calls,
but weak user registration procedures, the lack of deployed end-to-end identity mechanisms,
and the ease of providing fake location information increase the attack surface at PSAPs.
Attackers also have become more sophisticated over time, and use botnets to generate a large
volume of automated emergency calls to exhaust PSAP resources, including call takers and
first responders.
The appendix complements the dissertation with a detailed description of the LoST im-
plementation. It is too detailed to be included in the main part of the thesis but the content
is nevertheless an important result of the dissertation.
ChapterA
LoST Software
This annex contains a description of the software architecture of the prototype LoST client
and server implemention developed to verify correctness and completeness of the standard-
ization work done in the IETF. Typically, LoST will be integrated into a VoIP client and
VoIP proxy/gateway. This write-up focuses on the LoST software components and neglects
the software integration into a SIP stack.
The description for compiling, configuring and runnning the software focuses on Win-
dows. The software can be downloaded from http://ecrit.sourceforge.net.
A.1. LoST Client
The LoST client is written in C and makes use of the libxml2 third party library for parsing
XML structures. For use on Windows-based systems the getopt library has to be included
as well. For testing the LoST client a command line interface (CLI) is provided, which
accepts the parameters shown in Listing A.1. These command line parameters correspond
to the different features provided by the LoST protocol.
Listing A.1: LoST Client Command Line Interface Options
Usage:
client [--fs [-v t|f] [-b value|reference] [-r t|f]--civic|--geo2d
location -s service]
client [--ls]
client [--lsl [-r t|f] --civic|--geo location]
client [--gb key]
Main options:
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--fs send findService query
-v query attribute validateLocation: true/false (default false)
-b query attribute serviceBoundary: value/reference (default
reference)
-r query attribute recursive: true/false (default true)
--civic location element in civic format
--geo2d location element in geodetic-2d format
-s service uri: police/ambulance/fire
example:
client --fs -v t -r f --geo2d "12.567:-12.234" -s police
client --fs -b value \
--civic "Germany:Bavaria: :Munich: : :Otto-Hahn-Ring: : : :6: : : :
: :81675" \
-s fire
--ls send listServices query
example:
client --ls
--lsl send listServicesByLocation query
-r attribute recursive: true/false (default true)
--civic location element in civic format
--geo2d location element in geodetic-2d format
example:
client --lsl -r f --geo2d "12.567:-12.234"
--gb send getServiceBoundary query with key:
example:
client --gb 7214148E0433AFE2FA2D48003D31172E
geodetic-2d format:
"point-X:point-Y"
example: "12.567:-12.234"
civic format:
"country:A1:A2:A3:A4:A5:A6:PRD:POD:STS:HNO:HNS:LMK:LOC:FLR:NAM:PC"
example: "Germany:Bavaria: :Munich: : :Otto-Hahn-Ring: : : :6: : :
: : :81675"
For the performance evaluation the findService query with geodetic location information
is most important; the listServices, listServicesByLocation, and the getServiceBoundary
queries play a secondary role. The LoST client implementation only supports a single
geodetic location shape of the geo2d location profile, namely the Point. The Polygon, Cir-
cle, Ellipse, and ArcBand structures are not supported. For the purpose of this evaluation
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this is not a significant constraint given that GPS-enabled devices will mainly use the Point
location shape (or a circular area to express uncertainty about a point). More complex lo-
cation shapes are typically the result of network-based location determination techniques,
which are not used in this performance evaluation.
An example LoST client configuration is shown in Listing A.2. The LoST client needs
to be configured with the IP address and port number of the LoST server. Additionally, it
needs to know the URL path, which is constructed in this example configuration using the
Eclipse project name and the servlet name.
Listing A.2: LoST Client Configuration Example
serverLoST=127.0.0.1
page=/LoSTAppRoot/StartServlet
port=8080
An example findService query with geodetic location information is shown in Listing
A.3. The query instructs the LoST Server to use the police service URN to request a service
boundary by reference (rather than by value) and an interative query (rather than a recursive
query). The GPS coordinates for a location in Manhatten, New York are expressed as a
latitude:longitude pair. This location refers to the following civic address determined via
reverse geocoding: Sidewalk Clock at 200 5th Avenue, 5th Avenue, New York, NY 10035,
United States of America.
Listing A.3: LoST Client CLI Query with findService Query Example
./client --fs -b reference -r f --geo2d
"-81.1562038362026:40.4049754631706" -s police
The LoST client implementation is separated into several files, namely
findService findService.h and findService.c implement the findService query functionality
getServiceBoundary getServiceBoundary.h and getServiceBoundary.c implement the
getServiceBoundary query functionality
listServices listServices.h and listServices.c implement the listServices query functional-
ity
listServicesByLocation listServicesByLocation.h and listServicesByLocation.c imple-
ment the listServicesByLocation query functionality
location location.h defines the data structure for civic and geodetic location information.
location.c defines function to populate the data structure.
get config get config.h and get config.c implement the functionality to read the configu-
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ration file.
cl client cl client.h defines constants for CLI usage of the LoST client and cl client.c
implements the CLI parameter parsing. cl client.c also calls functions for LoST functions
and contains code for parsing civic information provided via the CLI.
http connection http connection.h and http connection.c implement the HTTP re-
quest/response interaction. Because of the different socket interfaces on Windows and
Linux-based systems the implementation varies between these two operating systems.
common common.h defines constants for debug, XML parameters, and emergency ser-
vice URIs.
client client.c is contains the main() function of the LoST client CLI program.
The LoST client reads the configuration file, parses the CLI parameters and invokes the
functions for building the respective LoST request. Then, the HTTP request is made to the
LoST server. Note that the prototype uses regular HTTP for communicating with the LoST
server. Then, the LoST client waits for the response from the LoST server, and prints the
response message. Finally, the HTTP connection is terminated and after releasing resources
the LoST client program is terminated.
To build the code for the LoST client on Windows it is easiest to use Microsoft Visual Stu-
dio and use the provided project files. When building the code from scratch (via Microsoft
Visual Studio) import all source and header files and use the NuGet package manager to
include the libxml2-vc140-static-32 64 and the libapr-iconv libraries along with any de-
pendencies. Additionally, the libraries wsock32.lib and libxml2.lib have to be added as an
additional dependency in the linker configuration. Note that the lost client.conf must be in
the same directory from which you run the LoST client executable.
A.2. LoST Server
The LoST server implementation is more complex than the client-side because it has to
connect to a database to store service boundaries. The LoST server is implemented in Java
and to run the Java application a Tomcat server is used. As a database PostgreSQL was se-
lected because it supports geospatial functionality via the PostGIS extension. For software
development Eclipse was used as an open source integrated development environment. To
execute the LoST server the Java SE Development Kit has to be installed and for develop-
ment the Java Development Kit (JDK). The implementation relies on the third party XML
library JDOM2, which provides a Java-based implementation for accessing, manipulating,
and outputting XML data. JDOMs SAXBuilder class can also be used as an XML parser.
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On Windows it is easiest to install PostgreSQL as part of the EnterpriseDB software
from https://www.enterprisedb.com, which is a pre-bundled version of the neces-
sary software to run PostgreSQL. The “StackBuilder” utility is then used to install the
PostGIS add-on. Configuring and optimizing a database system can be a challenge but
PostgreSQL offers a convient tool called PgAdmin 4, which offers a graphical interface
to connect to a database, to manipulate tables and views, and to execute queries among
many other functions. Access to the PostgreSQL database via the Java app is accomplished
via Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) for which a driver has to be downloaded from
https://jdbc.postgresql.org/download.html and added to the project settings in
Eclipse as an external JAR file.
The LoST server software also comes with a configuration file, similarly to the LoST
client. It can be found in WebContent/WEB-INF/config/config.xml and an example LoST
server configuration is shown in Listing A.4. Two different databases can be used to store
civic and geodetic location information, which is not utilized in the example configuration
because both point to the same database server. For LoST servers different modes of oper-
ations are available and can be set via the <mode> element in the config.xml file. These
modes are based on the roles defined in RFC 5582 [55]. The following modes can be set:
Resolver A resolver is contacted by a seeker, interacts with forest guides, and then queries
the appropriate tree. Resolvers may cache query results but do not source authoritative
mapping information.
TreeLeaf Leaf nodes are nodes without children, and only maintain mappings.
TreeNode Tree nodes only maintain coverage regions. Coverage regions point to LoST
servers while mapping data points to service URLs. Hence, the difference between cover-
age regions and mapping data is intentionally rather small and coverage regions are also
implemented as LoST-compatible shapes enclosing contiguous geographic areas or by
descriptors enumerating groups of civic locations. The primary difference is therefore to
what entities the URLs point to.
ForestGuide Forest guides facilitate coordination among trees and they keep track of the
coverage regions of all the trees for a service and a location profile. Forest guides only
redirect to LoST mapping servers.
In the example configuration in Listing A.4 the LoST server operates in a TreeLeaf mode.
The log file must be located in a writeable directory and the database indicated in the config-
uration file, postgis lost in our example, must exist. More details about the database setup
can be found in Section A.3.
Listing A.4: LoST Server Configuration Example
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<configuration>
<LoST>
<debug>true</debug>
<hostname>localhost</hostname>
<logFile>c://temp//LoST.log</logFile>
<dbCivicHostname>localhost</dbCivicHostname>
<dbCivicUsername>postgis</dbCivicUsername>
<dbCivicPassword>******</dbCivicPassword>
<dbCivicBase>postgis\_lost</dbCivicBase>
<dbLostHostname>localhost</dbLostHostname>
<dbLostUsername>postgis</dbLostUsername>
<dbLostPassword>******</dbLostPassword>
<dbLostBase>postgis\_lost</dbLostBase>
<mode>TreeLeaf</mode>
</LoST>
</configuration>
There are different ways to run server-side Java code; Java servlets is the technique uti-
lized by this implementation. The LoST server implementations registers itself (via the
Tomcat server) on a specific IP address, port number and at a specific URL path and waits
for incoming POST messages. The @WebServlet annotation is used to declare a servlet and
in the LoST server implementation the code can be found in MainServlet.java file where the
URL /StartServlet is registered. GET requests, on the other hand, will lead to an error (ac-
cording to the LoST specification). An incoming LoST request will cause the LoST server
to process the request according to its configured role. The prototype implementation is
not designed for efficiency. It reads the configuration file and connects to the database with
every request instead of reading the configuration once and maintaining it in memory as
well as keeping the database connection open while the server is running. Hence, there is
still potential for performance optimization. This has to be kept in mind when considering
the performance analysis.
The LoST server implementation is split into several Java files, which can be grouped
into four categories. These categories are (a) the main class, MainServlet.java, containing
code executed when a request is received, (b) code handling specific LoST queries, (c)
code implementing functionality needed by different LoST server roles, and (d) support
functionality. Not relevant to this description is the test class LoSTClient.java.
The code for handling specific LoST requests can be found in the following Java classes:
FindService This class implements parsing of the findService and findServiceByLocation
queries and produces the response message. Both geodetic and civic location information
are supported.
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GetServiceBoundary This class implements parsing of the getServiceBoundary request.
The getServiceBoundary request contains a value in the key attribute, which is used to
find the service boundary in the cache. This code makes use of the getServiceById() and
getIdByKey() functions implemented in the Base class.
ListServices This class implements parsing of the listServices query and makes use of the
database access function in the Base class via the listServices method. The listServices
method crafts the response message from the Response class via the listServicesResponse
method.
ListServicesByLocation This class implements the listServicesByLocation query and,
similiarly to the ListServices class, it also creates the corresponding response by utilizing
the listServicesByLocation method from the Base class.
ServiceBoundary The methods in this class construct the <serviceBoundary> element
based on civic or geodetic location information provided via parameters. For geodetic
location information the polygon is encoded following the recommendations provided in
RFC 5222 and RFC 5491. Not supported is the encoding of holes in services boundaries,
as described in RFC 5964 [146]. The methods in this class, namely createGeodetic2d and
createCivic, are used by the FindServiceResponse method of the FindService class and
by the getServiceBoundary method in the GetServiceBoundary class.
The code implementing functionality needed by different LoST server roles can be found
in the following Java classes:
Resolver The Resolver class implements functionality to fetch mappings from cache, and
if those are not present or outdated, then Forest Guides have to be contacted.
ForestGuide The ForestGuide class implements functionality to fetch coverage regions
from the database (for civic and geodetic location information) and to redirect the request
to the appropriate LoST mapping server.
TreeNode The TreeNode class implements functionality to interact with other Tree
Nodes or with Leaf Nodes (in an interative or recursive query style).
ParseFirst The ParseFirst class implements functionality of a TreeLeaf and contains code
for parsingf LoST requests based on the different types of requests available within the
LoST specification.
The support functionality is found in the following Java classes:
Base This class is responsible for handling database access. This class does not only
include code for establishing the connection to the PostgreSQL database using Java
Database Connectivity (JDBC) but also constructs the SQL queries needed for retrieving
the necessary information from the database. One example of an important SQL query
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used by findServiceByLocation is shown in Listing A.5.
Cache and CacheStruct These two classes implement cache management.
CommonRequestPattern This class parses the XML document to find the <service>
element.
Config This class reads the XML-based configuration file but also offers functionality for
event logging and for setting timestamps (used in logs and in LoST response messages).
ErrorContainer This class implements the error handling and generates LoST error re-
sponse messages.
Response This class implements generic LoST response functionality, such as creating
the <mapping>, the <serviceList>, <locationValidation>, and the <path> elements.
The Base class contains code to construct SQL queries and the most important SQL
query is to determine the record(s) where the emergency caller’s location is within the ser-
vice boundary of a PSAP. This point-in-polygon functionality is provided by ST Intersects()
provided by PostGIS. It takes two geometries and returns true if any part of those geome-
tries is shared between the two. The ST AsText() function converts the location data from
the database native binary format into a textual display format and ST GeomFromText()
provides the conversion into the reverse direction. Listing A.5 shows this important code
segment.
Listing A.5: Java Code for Constructing the findServiceByLocation SQL Query
String query="SELECT id, country, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, hno, pc,
service_number, ";
query+="prd, pod, sts, hns, lmk, loc, flr, nam, display_name,
sip, ";
query+="expires, last_updated, ST_AsText(area) as area ";
query+="FROM lost_services WHERE ";
query+="ST_Intersects(area, ST_GeomFromText(’POINT("+pointX;
query+=" "+pointY+")’))";
if (service !=null)
query+=" AND ( service=’"+service+"’ OR service=’sos’)";
query+=";";
A.3. Database
The LoST server Java application issues queries against a number of tables whereby some
of the tables are only used when the LoST server application operates in a specific role. The
following tables are used for the different roles:
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Resolver The Resolver uses the resolver cache and forest guides tables. The former table
is used for caching LoST responses while the latter table is used to obtain the list of LoST
Forest Guides.
TreeLeaf The TreeLeave uses the lost services and key cache tables. The lost services
table is used to store authoritative mapping information. The key cache table is used to
store service boundary information when those are accessed by reference rather than by
value.
TreeNode The TreeNode uses the tree children civic and tree children geodetic tables.
These two tables are used to store coverage areas for civic and geodetic location informa-
tion, respectively.
ForestGuide The Forest Guide uses the tree roots civic and tree roots geodetic tables.
These two tables again store coverage areas.
Figure A.1 shows the database design with the tables graphically.
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Figure A.1.: Database Design.
109 A.4. Performance Analysis
A.4. Performance Analysis
While the main purpose of the LoST client and LoST server implementation was to verify
correctness and completeness of the LoST specification, the performance was of interest to
many. Although the code has not been optimized for performance it still provides an indi-
cation of the upper bounds. For a realistic analysis the most important aspect is thereby to
select a country or region with many PSAP boundaries such that the point-in-polygon com-
putation, which is considered to be one of the more expensive operation in a LoST-based
deployment, can be evaludated. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain real-world PSAP
boundaries, even for research purposes, because this type of information is still consid-
ered commerically valuable and a competitive advantage for those companies who obtained
access to it. For practical reasons a simplifying assumption was made by assuming the
PSAP boundaries correspond to the shapes of US counties. The shape files of U.S. coun-
ties are published by the US Census Bureau in the Topologically Integrated Geographic
Encoding and Referencing system (TIGER) data set. The 2018 data set is available at
https://www2.census.gov/geo/tiger/TIGER2018//COUNTY/ and has 3233 entries.
The number of PSAPs in the US is roughly 6100; hence the TIGER county data set is a
good approximation of the U.S., which has the most complex PSAP infrastructure of any
country.
Figure A.2 shows a plot of the U.S. county database. The figure has been produced using
the open-source cross-platform desktop geographic information system application QGIS,
which is available for download at https://qgis.org, with the TIGER data retrieved
from the PostgreSQL database.
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Figure A.2.: Plot of the U.S. TIGER County Dataset (2018).
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The TIGER data set is available in shapefiles, which cannot be imported directly into the
Postgres database via the pgAdmin backup/restore tool. There are two techniques that can
be used for importing the data set. First, it is possible to use the external PostGIS Shapefile
Import/Export Manager tool. This tool can import the *.shp files found in the downloaded
ZIP archives. Second, an automated, but considerable more complex, procedure for down-
loading and importing the TIGER data set is available in form of scripts. The latter approach
uses the psql and the shp2pgsql command line tools. The next few paragraphs explain the
automated data download and importing.
Assuming that the database has already been configured to use the extensions for post-
gis, fuzzystrmatch, postgis tiger geocoder, and address standardizer the first step is to
use the pgAdmin utility to configure the paths to various programs. This is, unsurpris-
ingly, accomplished by modifying values in a specific field in the loader platform and the
loader variables tables. It is easiest to use the pgAdmin utility to select these two tables
in the tiger schema. By using the “View/Edit Data” function on the two tables showing all
rows displays the current values. The values set for the declare sect column have been set
to the values in Listing A.6 on my system, which will have to be adjusted to each system
depending on the US and the location of the binaries.
Listing A.6: Configuration Settings for the Loader Tables
set TMPDIR=F:\LoST\gisdata\temp\
set UNZIPTOOL="C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe"
set WGETTOOL="F:\Program Files (x86)\GnuWin32\bin\wget.exe"
set PGBIN=F:\Program Files\PostgreSQL\11\bin
set PGPORT=5432
set PGHOST=localhost
set PGUSER=postgres
set PGPASSWORD=<<password goes in here>>
set PGDATABASE=postgis_lost
set PSQL="F:\Program Files\PostgreSQL\11\bin\psql.exe"
set SHP2PGSQL="F:\Program Files\PostgreSQL\11\bin\shp2pgsql.exe"
Once this configuration data has been saved, the configuration can be used to create a
script, which will subsequently be used to perform the download and import. The command
line to execute this script is shown in Listing A.7. The semantics of the command line
parameters are described in the manual, which is available at https://www.postgresql.
org/docs/current/app-psql.html.
Listing A.7: Command line to generate the so-called Nation-Script
F:\LoST\gisdata>psql -U postgres -c "SELECT
Loader_Generate_Nation_Script(’windows’)" -d postgis_lost -tA >
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nation_script_load.bat
After successfully generating the nation script load.bat it can be executed as shown in
Listing A.8.
Listing A.8: Running the Nation-Script File
F:\LoST\gisdata>nation_script_load.bat
After a successful execution the data is imported into the indicated database and the
correctness can be verified by counting the rows in the county and state tables. The rows in
the county database should be 3233 and the number of rows in the state table should be 56.
Note that the same technique can be used to retrieve additional data from the TIGER
database to perform geocoding and reverse geocoding. Reverse geocoding is used to re-
solve a geodetic location into a civic address and geocoding performs the opposite. The
commands shown in Listing A.9 are necessary to download and import detailed civic infor-
mation of all states. Note, however, that the download of the detailed data will take both
time (potentially in the order of days) and harddisk space.
Listing A.9: Running the State-Script File
F:\LoST\gisdata>psql -U postgres -c "SELECT
Loader_Generate_Script(ARRAY[’AK’, ’AL’, ’AR’, ’AZ’, ’CA’, ’CO’, ’CT’,
’DC’, ’DE’, ’FL’, ’GA’, ’HI’, ’IA’, ’ID’, ’IL’, ’IN’, ’KS’, ’KY’, ’LA’,
’MA’, ’MD’, ’ME’, ’MI’, ’MN’, ’MO’, ’MS’, ’MT’, ’NC’, ’ND’, ’NE’, ’NH’,
’NJ’, ’NM’, ’NV’, ’NY’, ’OH’, ’OK’, ’OR’, ’PA’, ’RI’, ’SC’, ’SD’, ’TN’,
’TX’, ’UT’, ’VA’, ’VT’, ’WA’, ’WI’, ’WV’, ’WY’], ’windows’)" -d
postgis_lost -tA > F:\LoST\gisdata\state_script_load.bat
F:\LoST\gisdata>state_script_load.bat
The database structure used by the TIGER imported data, of course, does not correspond
to the structure the LoST server database uses. Hence, it is necessary to import relevant
information from the TIGER database into the LoST database. Figure A.3 shows 10 rows
added to the LoST database.
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Figure A.3.: Example data to be inserted in LoST Database.
The SQL query in Listing A.11 has been used to add the data shown in Figure A.3 to the
LoST database. Before it can be run, a separate table was created to perform a mapping
between the abbreviations of state names with the numerical values used in the TIGER data
set. The SQL script used for the import is shown in Listing A.10. While it is not stricly
necessary to perform such a mapping, the use of state name abbreviations (such as ‘CA’
for California) greatly improves readability of the results and enables easier debugging for
matching LoST requests against records in the database.
Listing A.10: SQL Code for Creating State Name Abbreviation Mapping
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS statefp_to_name;
CREATE TABLE statefp_to_name (
state_abbr char(2),
statefp char(2) PRIMARY KEY,
state_name character varying
);
INSERT INTO statefp_to_name (state_abbr,statefp,state_name)
VALUES
(’AK’,2,’ALASKA’),
(’AL’,1,’ALABAMA’),
(’AR’,5,’ARKANSAS’),
(’AS’,60,’AMERICAN SAMOA’),
(’AZ’,4,’ARIZONA’),
(’CA’,6,’CALIFORNIA’),
(’CO’,8,’COLORADO’),
(’CT’,9,’CONNECTICUT’),
(’DC’,11,’DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’),
(’DE’,10,’DELAWARE’),
(’FL’,12,’FLORIDA’),
(’GA’,13,’GEORGIA’),
(’GU’,66,’GUAM’),
(’HI’,15,’HAWAII’),
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(’IA’,19,’IOWA’),
(’ID’,16,’IDAHO’),
(’IL’,17,’ILLINOIS’),
(’IN’,18,’INDIANA’),
(’KS’,20,’KANSAS’),
(’KY’,21,’KENTUCKY’),
(’LA’,22,’LOUISIANA’),
(’MA’,25,’MASSACHUSETTS’),
(’MD’,24,’MARYLAND’),
(’ME’,23,’MAINE’),
(’MI’,26,’MICHIGAN’),
(’MN’,27,’MINNESOTA’),
(’MO’,29,’MISSOURI’),
(’MS’,28,’MISSISSIPPI’),
(’MT’,30,’MONTANA’),
(’NC’,37,’NORTH CAROLINA’),
(’ND’,38,’NORTH DAKOTA’),
(’NE’,31,’NEBRASKA’),
(’NH’,33,’NEW HAMPSHIRE’),
(’NJ’,34,’NEW JERSEY’),
(’NM’,35,’NEW MEXICO’),
(’NV’,32,’NEVADA’),
(’NY’,36,’NEW YORK’),
(’OH’,39,’OHIO’),
(’OK’,40,’OKLAHOMA’),
(’OR’,41,’OREGON’),
(’PA’,42,’PENNSYLVANIA’),
(’PR’,72,’PUERTO RICO’),
(’RI’,44,’RHODE ISLAND’),
(’SC’,45,’SOUTH CAROLINA’),
(’SD’,46,’SOUTH DAKOTA’),
(’TN’,47,’TENNESSEE’),
(’TX’,48,’TEXAS’),
(’UT’,49,’UTAH’),
(’VA’,51,’VIRGINIA’),
(’VI’,78,’VIRGIN ISLANDS’),
(’VT’,50,’VERMONT’),
(’WA’,53,’WASHINGTON’),
(’WI’,55,’WISCONSIN’),
(’WV’,54,’WEST VIRGINIA’),
(’WY’,56,’WYOMING’);
Listing A.11 shows the script that populates the lost services table with data from the
TIGER database. More specifically, the following data is copied: the country column, the
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A1 column (used for the top-level subdivision within a country, i.e. the state in the US),
A2 column (used for the political district; the county in the US), the service number col-
umn (which is set to 911 in the US), the service column (which uses the ‘sos’ service in
the example only), the sip column (which is the PSAP URI to be used by the seeker for
reaching out to a PSAP call taker over SIP), and the area column used to encode the ser-
vice boundary. Note that the area column contains the polygon information encoded in a
custom, PostgreSQL-specific binary format rather than the textual, GML-based representa-
tion shown earlier in LoST requests and responses. This is primarily done for performance
reasons.
Listing A.11: SQL Script for Importing the TIGER Data into the LoST Database
INSERT INTO lost_services (country, a1, a2, display_name, service_number,
service, sip, area)
SELECT ’US’ as country, s.state_abbr as a1, t.namelsad as a2, (’US - ’ ||
s.state_abbr || ’ - ’ || t.namelsad || ’- 911 SOS’)::varchar as
display_name, ’911’ as service_number, ’sos’ as service, ((’sip:sos@’
|| regexp_replace(lower(t.name), ’[ ]’,E’_’) ||
’.example.com’))::varchar as sip, t.geom as area
FROM tl_2018_us_county as t INNER JOIN statefp_to_name s ON t.statefp =
s.statefp
It is also useful to set the expires and last updated fields of the records for correct opera-
tion of the LoST server application. Listing A.12 shows the SQL code.
Listing A.12: SQL Script for updating expires and last updated
UPDATE lost_services
SET expires = ’2020-12-31T23:59:59Z,2007-03-05T15:08:00Z’
WHERE expires is NULL;
UPDATE lost_services
SET last_updated = ’2019-05-31T23:59:59Z,2007-03-05T15:08:00Z’
WHERE last_updated is NULL;
Once the example data is available in the LoST database, the next step is to construct
example queries that will be used by the seeker against the LoST server. There have to be
enough example queries to ensure that any anomalies caused by OS process scheduling,
delay variation between the LoST Java application running on the Tomcat server and the
PostgreSQL database, and varying latency on the network connection are averaged out.
Additionally, the queries have to contain points somewhere in the US and cover all the
counties. Furthermore, the location provided in two consecutive queries should not refer
to locations directly next to each other to avoid any geolocation caching capabilities by
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the database because this is rather unlikely behavior with real emergency calls as well.
Doing a ‘linear scan’ through points of the U.S. territory is therefore an unsuitable strategy.
Unfortunately, there is no public data about the geographical distribution of emergency calls
for selected regions available that could be re-used. Hence, any selection of example queries
will at best be a rough approximation of real-world behavior.
The following approach had been selected:
• First, random points in and around the U.S. had been selected and tested against the
database. When a hit was found the respective record was written into a database table
called ‘sample’.
• Second, the content of the ‘sample’ table was exported to a comma-separated values (csv)
file.
• Third, a Python program was used to extract the data from the csv file and to execute LoST
client calls. The results from those lookups was written into a text file for post-processing
of the results.
To select example locations within the U.S. the built-in capability in PostgreSQL for
random number generation with the random() function (in combination with the gener-
ate series() function) was utilized. Listing A.13 shows the SQL command to create the
table that holds the example queries. Note that the table contains more than just the X/Y
coordinates; information useful for debugging purposes, including the civic location infor-
mation and the service boundary that matched the query, was added as well.
Listing A.13: SQL Script to create table to hold sample queries.
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sample;
CREATE TABLE sample (
key serial PRIMARY KEY,
kid integer,
country character varying,
a1 character varying,
a2 character varying,
service_number character varying,
display_name character varying,
sip character varying,
x character varying,
y character varying,
geo geometry
);
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An SQL query covering the region of all U.S. counties, as shown in Listing A.14, is used
to generate example queries, which are inserted into the ‘sample’ table.
Listing A.14: SQL Script to create sample queries.
-- lat: from -179 to +180
-- lon: from +70 to -15
WITH
numbers AS
(
SELECT random() * 361-180 as x, random() * 87-16 as y
FROM generate_series(1, 50000000)
),
input_data AS
(
SELECT ST_GeomFromText(CONCAT_WS (’ ’, ’POINT(’, CAST (n.x AS text),
CAST (n.y AS text), ’)’)) as geo, n.x, n.y
FROM numbers as n
)
INSERT INTO sample(kid, country, a1, a2, service_number, display_name,
sip, x, y, geo)
SELECT l.id, l.country, l.a1, l.a2, l.service_number, l.display_name,
l.sip, n.x, n.y, n.geo
FROM input_data as n CROSS JOIN lost_services as l
WHERE ST_Intersects(l.area, n.geo)
ORDER BY l.country, l.a1;
When identifying a region from which random x/y coordinates are chosen it is useful to
verify whether the expression is indeed correct. This can be accomplished by the SQL query
shown in Listing A.15 where we use the min() and max() functions to determine whether
the generated random values are indeed within the +70 to -15 range.
Listing A.15: Verifying correctness of the generated data.
SELECT min(i), max(i) FROM (
SELECT trunc(random()*((72)+15)-16) AS i FROM generate_series(1,1000000)
) q;
Plotting the example queries using the QGIS application, see Figure A.4, shows whether
the sample queries have been correctly created and whether the entire region of the U.S. has
been covered by the example queries.
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Figure A.4.: Plot of example queries.
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Next, we have to export the content of the ‘sample’ table to an csv file, which will be
used for post-processing next. Listing A.16 shows the export commands.
Listing A.16: Exporting the example queries into a CSV file.
>psql -h localhost -U postgres -d postgis_lost
> postgis_lost=# \COPY (SELECT * FROM sample) TO ’example_queries.csv’
(format csv, delimiter ’;’)
A small section of the CSV file is shown in Figure A.5. The most important data is in
column 8 and 9 representing the X and Y coordinates of the query to be used.
Figure A.5.: CSV file with example queries.
Next, the example queries.csv is used as input to the Python script shown in List-
ing A.17. This short Python script reads each line of the CSV file and executes the
LoST client program with the X and Y coordinates as command line parameters. The
LoST client program has been compiled with the TIME MEASUREMENT and the
TIME MEASUREMENT SUMMARY C pre-processor directives enabled to produce
timing data. This timing data is written to a log file for final processing, which contains
three data points: the size of the LoST request (in bytes), the size of the LoST response
(in bytes), and the execution time (in msec). The execution time includes processing the
command line parameters to construct the LoST query until the time when the response has
been received.
Listing A.17: Python Script to parse CSV file and execute LoST queries.
import csv
import subprocess
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with open(’example_queries.csv’) as csv_file:
csv_reader = csv.reader(csv_file, delimiter=’;’)
line_count = 0
for row in csv_reader:
result = subprocess.run([’client’,’--fs -b reference -r f --geo2d
\"{row[8]}:{row[9]}\" -s police’],stdout=subprocess.PIP)
line_count += 1
print(f’Processed {line_count} lines.’)
For this performance measurement the following assumptions were made:
• No TLS is used in this test setup. The overhead of TLS as a communication security solu-
tion is described in other parts of this thesis and, once the handshake has been completed,
the overhead for symmetric key cryptography is minimal.
• Only geodetic location information is used because civic location lookups are much faster
database operations and do not even require special extensions to database systems.
• Only a single location shape (namely a point) is used in queries because the data provided
by the end device is supposed to be obtained via a GPS. Other location shapes, such
as circles (which are able to express uncertainty) or arc bands (which are typically used
in context of network-based location determination techniques) are not explored in this
performance investigation.
• Caching capabilies are not explored in this performance analysis. The use of caching (by
resolves as well as by seekers) would improve performance in a real-world scenario.
• Service boundares are transmitted by reference and subsequently not dereferenced. This
leads to smaller messages transmitted over the wire and obtaining service boundaries
is only useful when caching is utilized. Note also that the support for holes in service
boundaries, as described in RFC 5964, is not implemented in this prototype.
• To reduce the impact of network latency all components, i.e. LoST clients executed
sequentially from the Python script, LoST server as a Java application on the Tomcat
server, and PostgreSQL database) were executed on the same machine.
For the test setup an Intel Xeon CPU E3-1231 v3 @ 3.40 GHz with 4 cores and 8 threads,
with 16 GB of RAM and 8 MB cache running Windows 10 Home in version 10.0.18362 was
used. On the software side PgAdmin 4 in version 4.5 was used with PostgreSQL version
11.2 as well as Tomcat 9.0.19.
Figure A.6 shows the plot of the 550,000 query/response measurements graphically. The
minimal roundtrip time (RTT) of the LoST request/response is 39 msec and the maximum
is 856 msec. The median is 55 msec and the mean is 72.17 msec. The first and third quartile
is 48 msec and 65 msec, respectively.
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Figure A.6.: Roundtrip Time of findService Request/Response.
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As a conclusion, without special optimizations at the LoST server application nor at the
database itself, without the use of caching at resolvers and seekers the RTT of a LoST
interaction with a dataset taking the most complex PSAP infrastructure of any country into
account the use of LoST at the end device is not only feasible but also possible without
creating unnecessary delay in an emergency services situation.
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